


JPRS-TND-92-003
14 FEBRUARY 1992



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT E

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

19980112 015

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 6

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-003

CONTENTS

14 February 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

AFRICA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Arms Sanctions for Six African States *[London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 10 Jan]* 1

MOZAMBIQUE

Reportage on Possible Renamo Chemical Attack 1
Causes of Death Investigated *[Maputo Radio]* 1
Europe Offers Role in Probe *[Maputo Radio]* 1
Deserters Report Use *[Umtata Radio]* 1
News Reports Claim *[Maputo Radio]* 2

SOUTH AFRICA

Possession of Enriched Uranium Said 'Admitted' *[THE WEEKLY MAIL 7-13 Feb]* 2

CHINA

Nuclear Scientist Missing at Sichuan Tourist Spot 4
Missing for Two Months *[JIEFANG RIBAO 3 Jan]* 4
Special Search Continues *[Hong Kong MING PAO 14 Jan]* 4

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

China Orders Chemical Plant From Ube Industries *[KYODO]* 5
Nuclear Fuel Plant Seeks Boosted Capacity *[KYODO]* 5

NORTH KOREA

Koreas Exchange Copies of Non-Nuclear Accord *[Beijing XINHUA]* 5

SOUTH KOREA

DPRK Signs Agreement *[YONHAP]* 6
GDR Said To Give Nuclear Technology to North *[SINDONG-A]* 6

EAST EUROPE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Minister Charges 'Inside Help' in Weapons Theft *[CSTK]* 8
Havel, Calfa Discuss Control of Arms Trade *[Prague Radio]* 8

HUNGARY

IAEA Spokesman on Monitoring Nuclear Stocks *[Budapest Radio]* 8

ROMANIA

Official Estimates Enough Uranium for 30 Years [ROMPRES] 9

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Increased Funding for Atucha II Announced [CLARIN 27 Dec] 10
Nuclear Shipment to Iran Reportedly 'Suspended' [CLARIN 26 Jan] 10

BRAZIL

Goldemberg Seeks Scientists' Support for Nuclear Accord [O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 5 Jan] . 11
Interest in Russian Nuclear Experts Reported [O GLOBO 24 Jan] 12

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Syria, Iran Reportedly in Nuclear Weapons Pact [Hamburg DPA] 13

INDIA

PRC To Cooperate in Petrochemicals Sector [Delhi Radio] 13
Nonproliferation Treaty Stand 'Unsustainable' [THE TIMES OF INDIA 6 Jan] 13

IRAN

Government, Pakistan Set for Nuclear Cooperation [AL-DIYAR 12 Jan] 13
Russian Nuclear Experts, Equipment Acquired [Flag of Freedom Radio] 14
Ministry Denies Hiring Soviet Nuclear Scientists [Tehran Radio] 14

ISRAEL

'Understanding' With Russia on Nuclear Plant [Jerusalem Radio] 14

LIBYA

U.S. Concern Over Nuclear Projects 'Unfounded' [JANA] 14
Bureau Denies German Nuclear Shipment Accusation [JANA] 15

PAKISTAN

Minister Says France Seeks Nuclear Aid Safeguards [Islamabad International] 15
Spokesman on French Nuclear Pact; India, Japan [Islamabad Radio] 15

SUDAN

Iran Supplying Silkworm Missiles, F-7 Aircraft 15
Military Source Confirms [Cairo AL-WAFD 19 Jan] 15
Further on Military Cooperation [London AL-HAYAH 13 Jan] 15

CENTRAL EURASIA

FRG, U.S. Differ on CIS Tactical Nuclear Arms [IZVESTIYA 18 Jan] 17
France's Dumas Probes CIS Nuclear Safety [IZVESTIYA 28 Jan] 17
Russian Ministry Views Uranium Production, Sales [IZVESTIYA 18 Jan] 18

Nuclear Brain Drain Issue Causes 'Anxiety'	18
News Conference Held [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 28 Jan]	18
U.S. Prevention Tactics [IZVESTIYA 27 Jan]	19
Western Anxieties Cited [IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]	19
'Seriously Alarmed' [Russian TV]	20
Report of Nuclear Bomb Sales to Iran Viewed [Moscow International]	20
Swift Solutions Needed To Stem Brain Drain [Moscow TV]	20
Scraping of Tactical Nuclear Arms Possible [Russian TV]	21
Chemical Weapons Elimination Group Formed [POSTFACTUM]	21
Kurchatov Official Dismisses Brain Drain Issue [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 23 Jan]	21
Vorontsov Denies Nuclear Arms Sales to Iran [Radio Rossii]	22
Nuclear 'Inheritance' of USSR Causes 'Alarm' [IZVESTIYA 22 Jan]	22
Quick Elimination of Nuclear Arsenal Urged [IZVESTIYA 23 Jan]	23
General Medvedev Rules Out Nuclear Misuse [Prague RUDE PRAVO 17 Jan]	25
News Conference Discusses Uranium Sales Issue [Moscow Radio]	25
Geneva Delegate Cited on Weapons' Elimination [Moscow Radio]	26
Measures Outlined To Prevent Brain Drain [INTERFAX]	26
Recruitment of Nuclear Scientists Seen an Issue	27
No Evidence of Brain Drain [Moscow TV]	27
Likely Flight to Third World [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 21 Jan]	27
Proliferation Threat Assessed [PRAVDA 21 Jan]	27
Belarus Nuclear Weapons Moved to Russia [TASS]	29
Estonia To Sign Nonproliferation Treaty [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 9 Jan]	29
Kazakhstan Link With PLO Outlined [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Jan]	30
Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev on SS-19 Missile Launch [TASS]	30
Kazakhstan Legislator on Nuclear Arms [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 22 Jan]	30
Kazakhstan Denies Nuclear Arms Trade With Iran [TASS]	31
Lithuanian President Views Nuclear Arms [London TV]	31
Article Rebuts Uranium Sales 'Canard' [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 7 Jan]	32
Tajik Role in 'Islamic Bomb' Debunked [ZHIZN Jan]	32
Tajikistan Denies Sale of Uranium Abroad [INTERFAX]	34
U.S. Concern Over Arms Exports Noted [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 11 Jan]	34
Ukraine Will Become Nuclear Free	35
Kravchuk on Nuclear Arms [TASS]	35
Dumas News Conference [INTERFAX]	35
Ukraine, Belarus To Lose Tactical Nuclear Arms [POSTFACTUM]	35
Ukraine Wants Nuclear-Free Area by 2000 [TASS]	36

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Adherence to Non-Proliferation Pact Announced [Paris Radio]	37
---	----

GERMANY

Genscher 'Worried' About Nuclear Proliferation [SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 23 Jan]	37
Intelligence Services Warn of Nuclear 'Blackmail' [DER SPIEGEL 27 Jan]	37
Nuclear Technology Bound for Libya Intercepted [DPA]	38
Genscher Urges Action on Nuclear Proliferation	38
Talks With UN Secretary [DPA]	38
Comments Further [DPA]	38
Genscher, Ghali Discuss Nuclear Arms [DPA]	38
Former Soviet Plutonium, Uranium To Be Imported	38
Precautionary Measure [ADN]	38
Planned Imports Denied [DPA]	39
FRG Agreed to Nuclear Exports to Iraq [DPA]	39
Participation in Iranian Arms Production Viewed [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 29 Jan]	39
Government To Punish Illegal Arms Exports [SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 24 Jan]	39

Bundestag Takes Measures Against Arms Exports	40
Foreign Trade Law Amended [ADN]	40
Export List Reduced [ADN]	40
European Regulations Urged [DPA]	40

NETHERLANDS

Firm Accused of Nuclear Equipment Sales to Libya [Hilversum Radio]	41
--	----

SWITZERLAND

Officials Seize Documents on Uranium Trafficking [AFP]	41
--	----

INTERNATIONAL

IAEA Director Discusses Nuclear Proliferation [Vienna DIE PRESSE 30 Jan]	42
Joint Export Controls for Strategic Arms Planned [Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 23 Jan]	43

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Arms Sanctions for Six African States

92WP0137A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL
in English 10 Jan 92 p 8

[Article: "Britain: Arms Sanctions"]

[Text] Six African states are on a new British Department of Trade list of 33 countries considered sensitive destinations for exports because of their suspected involvement in producing weapons of mass destruction or in missile programmes, or because London fears they might transfer sensitive equipment to third parties.

South Africa's inclusion is no surprise in view of its known involvement in nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Egypt is presumably named because of its rocket programmes, its interest in chemical weapons and its past role as a conduit for sensitive technology supplies to Iraq. But Baghdad's links to Sudan, Tunisia and Mauritania have failed to earn these countries a listing. For Libya, its chemical weapons, missile and nuclear projects reinforce existing sanctions.

The listing of Angola and Somalia may be linked to chemical weapons use in their respective civil wars, while Algeria is presumably included, because of its reported clandestine, Chinese-aided, nuclear programme.

Explaining that the list was 'based on strategic and proliferation concerns and other criteria, including the risk of diversion and the lack of effective export controls', Trade Minister Tim Sainsbury said that, while export licences would not automatically be refused for shipments to the listed countries, they would be granted only 'in accordance with stringent criteria'.

MOZAMBIQUE

Reportage on Possible Renamo Chemical Attack

Causes of Death Investigated

MB2201182392 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network
in Portuguese 1730 GMT 22 Jan 92

[Text] A team of South African military and civilian medical doctors arrived in Maputo this afternoon to investigate the causes of the death of an undisclosed number of Mozambique Government troops in clashes with Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] rebels in the border region of Macaene, southern Maputo Province, on 16 January. The Mozambican military authorities have admitted the possibility of chemical weapons having been used in the Renamo operation. This can be proved once analyses have been carried out by a team that has been established, consisting of medical doctors from the two countries and other Mozambican partners.

An officer with Mozambique's Border Guard Troops has told the Voice of Combat radio program that an unidentified aircraft had overflowed the region shortly before those toxic means were used. The source added that the chemical weapons were allegedly used one day after government troops captured (Ngungwe) base which Renamo's Mozambican rebels regarded as impregnable.

The South African doctors returned home today, carrying some analyses for further investigation. It is not known when results of the investigation will be disclosed.

Under the terms of international conventions the use of chemical and biological weapons is strictly prohibited. It will be recalled that Mozambique is signatory to the Geneva Conventions and (?six) additional protocols.

Europe Offers Role in Probe

MB3101111592 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 31 Jan 92

[Text] Switzerland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France have expressed an interest in participating in an investigation to assess the nature of the war materiel used by the Mozambique National Resistance, Renamo, during an attack on the Macaene border area, in Maputo Province, on 16 January.

A source in the National Defense Ministry has said that the investigation should be over by February. Mozambican, South African, and UN technicians are participating in the investigation.

The Mozambican authorities have admitted the possibility that Renamo used chemical weapons during that attack on Mozambican military personnel.

South African medical personnel visited Maputo on 29 January within the framework of the investigation.

Deserters Report Use

MB0302153592 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1500 GMT 3 Feb 92

[Text] For the first time in their 16-year antigovernment war, Mozambique's Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] rebels are reported to be using chemical weapons. Speaking to journalists in Mozambique's capital Maputo today, Renamo deserters said these weapons were meant to be used in an intensified attack against Maputo suburbs. Rachel Waterhouse reports:

Ex-rebel member Vitorino Fernandes gave himself up after government soldiers attacked a rebel base at Maxixi, southern Maputo Province, on 22 January.

According to Fernandes, 50 especially trained Renamo soldiers arrived at Maxixi the day before, carrying poison-filled bullets and oxygen masks.

The men came from Ngungwe base, 10 km from the South African border, and said they were trained at Phalaborwa camp in the South African Transvaal [Province].

They told Fernandes they used toxic bullets once already, to attack Macaene in Maputo Province, and planned to use them next day against four Maputo suburbs.

Ten government soldiers and five dead bodies were carried to Maputo Central Hospital last month, following the attack on Macaene. The injured complained of vomiting, burning sensations, and chest pains, and said some of their colleagues went mad before they died.

The government is still investigating the issue, and has called on help from a South African team of military medical experts.

News Reports Claim

*MB0302183092 Maputo Radio Maputo in English
1800 GMT 3 Feb 92*

[Excerpt] A man, who defected from the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] rebels in Mozambique, told a Maputo news conference today that he had spoken with Renamo paratroopers who confirmed the use of chemical weapons during a clash with the Mozambican Army near the South African border on 16 January. The man, Vitorino Fernandes, a former soldier demobilized from the Mozambican Army in 1986, said he had been kidnapped by Renamo last year when rebels ambushed his car on the road between Maputo and Swaziland. He had been press-ganged into Renamo and spent six months with the rebels in various parts of Maputo Province.

Mr. Fernandes said that last month a group of men, including Renamo paratroopers, arrived at the base in which he was living and said they had come from the Ngungwe base near the South African border where the chemical weapons incident is said to have happened. He said the paratroopers were all carrying gas masks linked to oxygen bottles which they said were necessary to protect them against a weapon they were carrying and which could be fired from a gun. [passage omitted]

SOUTH AFRICA

Possession of Enriched Uranium Said 'Admitted'

*MB0802070992 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 7-13 Feb 92 p 18*

[Article by Martin Navias, lecturer in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London: "Yes, SA [South Africa] Could Build Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] South Africa has admitted to having enriched uranium to above 90 percent, according to a report in a specialist nuclear technology trade journal. The significance of this is that uranium so treated is capable of

being used in nuclear weapons. The article in NUCLEAR FUEL, printed in Germany, has so far attracted little attention.

This may be the first opening to the true story of Pretoria's quest for a nuclear force.

There has long been speculation that South Africa has manufactured material that can be employed for use in nuclear weapons but Pretoria's admission—made in an initial inventory report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—would be the first official indication that there was substance to these concerns.

Natural uranium is found in large quantities in South Africa but in its natural form it is not usable as a nuclear explosive. It has to undergo a complex process called enrichment before it can be used as a weapon. South Africa has such facilities in Valindaba in the Transvaal. Until now South Africa has refused to admit that it was enriching uranium to weapons grade levels though there have often been statements indicating that the country has the capability to do so.

Pretoria was required to make such a report to the IAEA as a result of its signature and ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in October last year. The NPT forbids signatory countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. New members have to provide an inventory of nuclear materials in their possession.

A key question is how much weapons grade material has been produced in South Africa? Nuclear trade analyst Mark Hibbs, who acquired the information for the trade journal, told THE WEEKLY MAIL that the report remains highly secret and IAEA officials refuse to state whether South Africa has admitted to producing weapons grade material.

Hibbs maintains that "given the present lack of information we cannot state for certain how much enriched uranium Pretoria has produced. Theoretically it is possible that the figure is in the scores of kilograms."

While estimates vary it is generally assumed that 35kg of enriched uranium would be needed to make a weapon, though more sophisticated weapons designs may only require 15kg or less. It is therefore possible that South Africa has manufactured enough enriched uranium for a significant nuclear force.

A 15 to 25kg device would be enough to make a bomb of the power similar to that dropped by the United States on Hiroshima in 1945.

Analysts have long attempted to estimate how many nuclear weapons South Africa has succeeded in producing. Leading US nuclear proliferation expert Leonard Spector, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, has calculated that South Africa has had the ability since 1981 to produce about 50kg of highly enriched uranium each year at the Valindaba pilot

enrichment plant in the Transvaal. From this plant alone South Africa could have during the 1980s manufactured material for between 20 and 30 nuclear weapons.

In order to have produced so much South Africa would have had to have worked the plant at full capacity all the time. However, it is unlikely that this was ever done. The site was shut in 1990.

Pretoria also built a far larger enrichment plant at Valindaba. This semi-commercial scale facility was in fact 30 times larger than the pilot enrichment plant and while this does not mean that it could have produced 30 times the amount of enrichment [as published] uranium, it could have significantly upgraded the amount of output.

There is an enormous range of calculations that have to be considered when making even a rough estimate of South Africa's nuclear arsenal. All that can be said with confidence is that the capability was there for significant nuclear weapons production to have taken place.

Both enrichment facilities at Valindaba have been outside the scope of international safeguards and their true production rates have not been known. The IAEA will have to check the veracity of the South African report by making their own inspections of the plants. Whether they will ever be fully satisfied that they know the full scope and history of South Africa's enriched uranium production is hard to tell.

Why South Africa would ever have wanted to produce such weapons is far from clear. Analysts tend to agree that the motivation was more related to issues of status than purely military considerations. There were certainly no obvious targets against which to deliver nuclear weapons.

South Africa's nuclear arsenal possibly consists primarily of gravity bombs, though nuclear artillery shells cannot be ruled out. There were also suggestions in 1989 and 1990 that rocket tests near Arniston indicated that Pretoria was also interested in a nuclear missile delivery system. The South African Defence Force appears to have shelved its missile plans.

It is possible that by the middle of the year we may have a fuller picture of South Africa's nuclear material production efforts. There will undoubtedly emerge strong pressures on the IAEA to make public their findings. International efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons have been gaining pace over the past few months, and many analysts will demand to see how much South Africa was able to do and, significantly, who was helping the country to do it.

Important questions will also be whether South Africa imported low enriched uranium and from which countries and whether there were any foreign individuals, companies or countries involved with South Africa's nuclear programme. It is reasonable to assume that some will be most embarrassed by the findings.

Nuclear Scientist Missing at Sichuan Tourist Spot**Missing for Two Months**

*OW1501132392 Shanghai JIEFANG RIBAO in Chinese
3 Jan 92 p 3*

[Article by JIEFANG RIBAO reporter Ling Feng (0407 7364): "Hua Tianqiang Mysteriously Disappears in Emei Shan—Still Missing After More Than Two Months of Search;" JIEFANG RIBAO headline]

[Excerpt] A report from Emei Shan in Sichuan in October 1991—Hua Tianqiang, a senior engineer of a research institute in Shanghai under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, suddenly disappeared during a sightseeing tour in Emei Shan, and he is still missing after more than two months of careful searching. [passage omitted]

Special Search Continues

*HK1501050592 Hong Kong MING PAO in Chinese
14 Jan 92 p 2*

[“Special Article” by special correspondent Pai Chu (4101 4554): “Nuclear Expert Hua Tianqiang Suddenly Disappears, Mainland China Does Not Rule Out Possibility of Being Kidnapped by Outsiders”]

[Excerpt] Mainland China’s well-known nuclear expert Hua Tianqiang suddenly disappeared during his sightseeing tour in Sichuan Province three months ago. His whereabouts are still unknown to this day. Because Hua Tianqiang knows many state secrets about the study of the atomic nucleus, his disappearance has aroused the concern of China’s hierarchy. China’s public security and state security organs have organized special persons

to search the Emei Shan. This search has been going on for nearly three months without avail, and it has been learned that the search is still continuing.

Searching the Emei Shan for Three Months Without Avail

This is another mysterious case concerning the disappearance of a Chinese scientist, following the first in which a well-known Chinese geologist Peng Jiamu strangely disappeared in Luobubo, Xinjing, in 1978. It has been reported that relevant investigation organs do not rule out the possibility that Hua Tianqiang has been “kidnapped” by certain “overseas hostile forces.”

Hua Tianqiang is the director of the Information Office of the Shanghai Institute of Atomic Nucleus under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Relevant sources have disclosed that Hua Tianqiang went to attend a meeting in Chengdu in mid-October last year. After the meeting concluded, he joined a sightseeing tour to the Emei Shan. After arriving at Wannian Temple at about 1000 on 15 October, the tour group was dismissed and its members went sightseeing by themselves. According to a preset schedule, the route of the tour started from Wannian Temple and ended at Wuxian Hill by way of Qingying Temple and Yixiantian. The organizer of the tour told all members of the group to be sure to arrive at a parking lot of Wuxian Hill by 1700. After wandering in Wannian Temple for about half an hour, Hua Tianqiang parted company with other members of the group and walked toward Qingying Temple alone. At 1700 that afternoon, Hua Tianqiang did not turn up at the parking lot of Wuxian Hill at the scheduled time and has vanished without a trace since then. [passage omitted]

JAPAN

China Orders Chemical Plant From Ube Industries

OW2512120191 Tokyo KYODO in English 1029 GMT
25 Dec 91

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 25 KYODO—Ube Industries Ltd., a major chemical firm, and General Trading House Marubeni Corp. said Wednesday they have jointly received a chemical plant order from China's National Technical Import and Export Corp.

The companies said the 19 billion yen plant to produce ammonia from coal gas will be installed at a chemical fertilizer plant in Shaanxi Province.

The plant will have the capacity to produce about 1,000 tons of ammonia daily, the companies said.

They said a formal agreement on the deal will be signed in January after screening by the government's overseas economic cooperation fund.

It will be the first major chemical fertilizer deal to be covered by Japan's yen credit to China since the military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June 1989, they said.

Construction of the plant is scheduled to begin next spring for completion in four years, the companies said.

Nuclear Fuel Plant Seeks Boosted Capacity

OW3001052892 Tokyo KYODO in English 0454 GMT
30 Jan 92

[Text] Aomori, Jan. 30 KYODO—The Japan Nuclear Fuel Industries Corp. on Thursday asked the Science and Technology Agency for permission to boost the productivity of the nation's first commercial uranium enrichment plant, corporation officials said.

The corporation has so far obtained permission to produce 600 tons SWU (separative work unit) per year at the plant at Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, northern Japan.

The application submitted to the agency seeks expansion of production capacity to 1,050 tons SWU per year at the plant.

Agency officials predicted approval of the request in a year, after safety checks and screenings by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission.

The Rokkasho plant is the first large-scale commercial uranium enrichment facility to be set up in a country with no nuclear weapons.

The plant is scheduled to start commercial operation in February, the officials said.

They said they plan to start the expansion of the plant in March next year if they get the permission. The cost for the expansion will be some 250 billion yen, the officials said.

NORTH KOREA

Koreas Exchange Copies of Non-Nuclear Accord

OW2101164092 Beijing XINHUA in English
1526 GMT 21 Jan 92

[Text] Pyongyang, January 21 (XINHUA)—Delegates from both sides of Korea exchanged signed copies of a non-nuclear accord at Panmunjom today, completing procedures for "The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

The accord, signed by respective prime ministers, will come into effect after the sixth round of inter Korean high-level talks to be held in Pyongyang February 18 to 21.

The exchange was made in the conference room of the neutral nations supervisory commission at the border village.

The accord bans the two sides of Korea from testing, producing, possessing and deploying nuclear weapons on their territories.

Both sides agreed to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and refrain from possessing nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

They also agreed to allow inspection of objects chosen by the other side through procedures and methods defined by the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control.

According to the accord, the two sides will form and operate the North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control within one month after the publication of the joint declaration.

A report from the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY quoted Choe U-chin, a delegate from the North side as saying the joint declaration came a result of the anti-nuclear peace policy consistently maintained by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

He said the joint declaration was a "historical document" in that it removed the danger of nuclear war from the Korean Peninsula and contributed to peace and security in Asia and the world.

It had epochal significance in creating a favorable precondition for the peaceful reunification of the Korean nation, he added.

The non-nuclear agreement, along with a reconciliation accord signed on December 13, is seen by observers as the key to peace on the peninsula.

SOUTH KOREA**DPRK Signs Agreement**

SK3001093992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0920 GMT 30 Jan 92

[Text] Vienna, Jan. 30 (YONHAP)—North Korea signed a nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Thursday, meeting an obligation under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] after more than six years' delay.

North Korean Vice Minister of Nuclear Industry Hong Kun-pyo and IAEA Director-general Hans Blix represented each side in the signing ceremony held at the IAEA headquarters here.

North Korea joined the NPT in December 1985 but delayed signing the accord, an obligation NPT signatories should fulfill within 18 months of joining.

The accord will take effect after it is ratified by North Korean President Kim Il-song and the ratified document is delivered to the IAEA. North Korea should make a report on all the nuclear materials it possesses to the IAEA by the 30th day of the month after the accord goes into effect.

International attention is focused on whether North Korea would include the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, in the report. North Korea is believed to be already capable of building an atomic bomb or only a couple of years away from doing so.

The IAEA and North Korea will set up a supplementary agreement within 90 months after the accord takes effect, paving the door to international inspection of nuclear facilities in the North. The IAEA can also carry out an inspection even before concluding the supplementary agreement in order to confirm the initial report of North Korea.

"The IAEA's basic position is that inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities should be launched at the earliest possible date, once necessary conditions are met. If the accord is ratified in February, inspection will be possible in the first half of the year," an IAEA official said.

"If North Korea delays ratification, it may be urged to hurry in a meeting of IAEA Board of Governors opening on Feb. 24," the official said.

South Korean Ambassador to Austria Yi Chang-chun said here Wednesday that after North Korea's ratification, "attention will be on North Korea's first report on its nuclear facilities and materials."

"North Korea must immediately ratify the accord. If it postpones doing so, the international community will suspect that Pyongyang is trying to earn time to hide its nuclear facilities."

The ambassador, asked to comment after North Korea's signing Thursday, said, "if North Korea violates the safeguards accord in the days ahead, it will be impossible to peacefully settle the issues pertaining to its nuclear project."

The nuclear issue has been one of the major stumbling blocks in North Korea's efforts to normalize relations with the United States, and with Japan.

GDR Said To Give Nuclear Technology to North
WA1812020091

[Editorial Report] An article in Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean in December 1991, attributed to a German economics professor at Freedom University in Berlin, noted that nuclear technology and nuclear weapons materials were either sold or transferred in "substantial" amounts from the former East Germany to North Korea through various bilateral scientific and technological agreements between the two governments, or through scientists and private industry.

As of November 1989, there were approximately 650 East German-trained top scientists in North Korea. Their specialization typically was in military technology, such as the maintenance of the MiG fighter as well as in "peaceful uses of nuclear power." In the field of production technology and plant facilities, the East German scientists made "significant contributions" to North Korean micro-electronics, opto-electronics, sensor technology, ICs, and robotics technologies.

The article notes that several government-to-government agreements on science and technology had been signed between the two countries since 1950. In 1985, the two governments concluded a most significant "agreement of technology transfer for the maintenance of the MiG 21 fighter and its gear system." This agreement, classified as top secret and effective up to December 1990 and automatically renewable for another five years, was signed by North Korean Premier Yon Hyong-muk. It stipulated that an annual meeting among government representatives (six respectively) be held to discuss the MiG-related technology transfer.

Another key government accord for technology transfer of nuclear energy "for peaceful uses" was signed in May 1989 between the East German Nuclear and Radioactive Safety Committee and the North Korean nuclear power industry minister. This accord was an extended but stronger version of the 1984 agreement which was signed by the premiers of both countries. The 1984 agreement on economic, scientific, and technological assistance was the "basis" for technology transfer in the fields of material and metallic industry, machine manufacturing, electrical equipments, electronics industry, and chemical industry.

The SINDONG-A article notes that numerous scientific exchanges have taken place through non-governmental channels. It points to the signing of a five-year technological cooperation between the engineers associations of the respective countries in October 1985, and also a series of academic exchanges in various fields such as micro-electronics, automation, and energy. For example, since 1979 Dresden

Transportation University in East Germany has maintained academic exchanges with Pyongyang Railway University and has trained "24 top transportation experts" of North Korea now occupying senior government positions. Most noteworthy, the article stresses, is a Berlin-based (Reiss) Engineering Company's export of "materials needed for nuclear weapons production" to North Korea at the end of 1990.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Minister Charges 'Inside Help' in Weapons Theft**

*LD2801222492 Prague CSTK in English 1758 GMT
27 Jan 92*

[Text] Prague Jan 27 (CSTK)—Those who have stolen weapons and ammunition from the Czechoslovak Army over the last year had inside help, Czechoslovak National Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky said today.

"These extensive thefts were carried out by professionals, and everything indicates that persons whose position entitled them to access to the stockpiles of ammunition and arms also took part in them", Dobrovsky told journalists.

He said there was evidence that the arms have already been taken out of the country.

The minister was speaking after a special meeting of the commanders' corps of the Czechoslovak Army, called to look into the recent spate of thefts of military equipment.

Deputy chief of the military police of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff, Colonel J. Stetka, told the newspaper "RUDE PRAVO" on January 23 that six tank machine guns, 57 automatic submachine guns, and numerous other weapons have been stolen from the Czechoslovak Army since last May.

Dobrovsky said low-quality work of guards and obsolete security systems were the main problems that made the thefts possible.

He dismissed concerns voiced by the chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, Jiri Svoboda, that the stolen weapons could end up in the hands of underground political groups in Czechoslovakia. He said he knew of only one political party who had been armed—the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "whose successor is the party of Mr Svoboda".

Havel, Calfa Discuss Control of Arms Trade

LD2901213492 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 2100 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] A discussion between President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Marian Calfa at Prague Castle today centered first and foremost at the manufacture and export of arms. After the meeting Prime Minister Calfa told journalists that the main topic of the conversation was the possibility of monitoring arms exports and the information leakage in this field. In this connection the prime minister emphasized that it will be necessary to adopt a package of measures to ensure consistent state control over the arms trade.

HUNGARY**IAEA Spokesman on Monitoring Nuclear Stocks**

LD2601132392 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0805 GMT 26 Jan 92

[From the "World Clock" program]

[Text] It is not always possible to immediately decide whether what we hear is real or manufactured news. There are, for example, the guesses as to how many smaller or greater, sympathetic or unpleasant countries, are manufacturing nuclear weapons. A spokesman for the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], which has its headquarters in Vienna, is trying to reassure us, but our reporter Peter Zentai has doubts. You will have to decide for yourselves.

[Zentai] The chief spokesman for the IAEA, in the name of the organization he represents, declares that they do not believe in the secret nuclear cooperation between Iraq and Algeria. There are two reasons for this: First, there is no evidence for this, although it is the agency which could easiest obtain such evidence; and second, nothing is easier than to obtain unprocessed uranium. Uranium can be obtained nowadays at any time, in any quantity, and quite cheaply. What would be the point of Algeria importing 10 tonnes of uranium specifically from Iraq, David Kidd [chief IAEA spokesman] asked me. Algeria could obtain the necessary uranium in much simpler ways, he continued. For us, the agency, it is much more important that the Algerian Government is even now preparing to sign a treaty of cooperation with the IAEA, according to which foreign experts can monitor the newest Algerian nuclear installations built with Chinese help, the 15-megawatt capacity reactor, which is very much larger than the old reactor at present in operation in Algiers. This latter is also open for our inspectors, argues the agency press chief, which is fully in accord with the Algerian version .

To this I asked in reply: What would happen if in the Arab country the extreme Islamic forces gained power in the elections and tore up the agreement, or misled international public opinion—and this in fact can be imagined in any, mainly Third World countries.

[Kidd in English fading into Hungarian report by Zentai] Presently in Algeria, the government which is in power is the one we are signing agreements with, and we have no reasons to negotiate with anybody else there, replies David Kidd, adding that the agency regards the Algerian ambassador delegated to it as the only intermediary, and have excellent cooperation with him. Kidd added that governments come and go, but the international treaties usually remain. Consequently we have good reasons to suppose that the more than 140 countries which have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will continue to adhere to its conditions. We have no evidence to the contrary, and although Algeria does not belong to the

majority it has special relations with the Agency, so from now on nuclear research in Algeria may be subjected to extensive monitoring.

The essential point is that if a country should abrogate such a document or the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the consequence of such a move is international pressure, and a boycott which simply makes nonpeaceful nuclear development impossible—let us just think of the example of Iraq. Mr. Kidd thinks that the developments of the past months allow one to draw the conclusion that states are beginning to give up their nuclear military plans for good. South Africa recently joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and North Korea in the past few days has stated that, like Algeria, it is ready to be subjected to the monitoring of the Agency. The Argentine and Brazil heads of state a few weeks ago signed similar agreements in Vienna. I would reiterate that the world press and many important politicians do not find the situation so reassuring, because everyone is concerned about the fate of the nuclear arsenal piled up in the former Soviet Union. Likewise we cannot be certain about the intentions of the Third World on a long-term basis.

[Kidd] Concerning the Soviet Union, the evaluation of the events there does not belong among the tasks of the agency, concluded my discussion partner. But from his words it transpires that the agency offered to take stock of and control the fissionable materials which remain after the elimination of Soviet nuclear equipment. To leave such materials without control means that their free marketing is undoubtedly of great potential danger, so the agency would be willing to take care of their storage as well. But the Vienna center does not have and is never likely to have the authorization to take part in the destruction of weapons anywhere, perhaps in the former Soviet states, or

participate in disarmament. The agency would rather take on a kind of accountant role by collecting all reliable information about the existing and dismantled arsenals, and the locations of nuclear materials.

ROMANIA

Official Estimates Enough Uranium for 30 Years

AU2701150792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1411 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 27/1/1992—Surprisingly Romania contributes 35 per cent to the nuclear programme and just 25 per cent to the conventional programme; the vice-president of the National Electricity Company RENEL, Tiberiu Campureanu, told a news conference in reference to the nuclear power station at Cernavoda. The eleven Romanian commercial companies involved at Cernavoda may operate also on foreign markets in future having passed this test of nuclear materials and equipment reliability. The total number of Romanian enterprises contributing to the nuclear power programme is 250.

Heavy water is to be made in this country as is the nuclear fuel, and we have enough uranium for thirty years' operation, Mr. Campureanu added.

Remedial operations dated back to 1990 and put at 2.5 billion lei were also discussed. The money comes from the investment fund, not from auction which would have entailed "disadvantages" as Mr. Campureanu said.

Payoff time is expected to take 12 years, with one kilowatt supplied by the station being estimated at 6.1 lei, in line with current prices, it was also said.

ARGENTINA

Increased Funding for Atucha II Announced

*92WP0130A Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish
27 Dec 91 p 26*

[Text] "We are on the edge. If a new nuclear power plant is not built in this country by the year 2000, there will not be enough power to meet Argentina's electricity needs," warned Manuel Mondino, director of the National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA).

In his year-end report on 1991, Mondino explained that "although the Atucha II plant will be 90-percent completed by the end of 1992 and will come on line in 1995, by the end of the millennium the small plants built in the 1960s will have to be decommissioned. This development, along with the depletion of gas reserves, will lead to a power shortage that could cause problems without a new source of power."

Because the CNEA must project energy needs far in advance, in 1992 the largest energy investment it will make with national budget funds will be \$359 million, for continuing construction of the Atucha II plant, out of a total requirement of \$950 million for the sector.

"The \$950 million will come from foreign credit and contributions from the treasury: \$142 million in cash and \$190 million in bonds. We believe that 1992 is the year to give atomic energy a shot in the arm. It would help a lot, however, if the state would pay us what it owes in arrears for power: \$257 million," Mondino said.

Despite these messages of alarm, the director of the CNEA is optimistic. In 1991 some records were broken, and this touched the heart of Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, he said. "Atucha surpassed its own record for uninterrupted operations: Before, it was 215 days; this year it was 280 days. Just think that back in 1989, at the height of the energy crisis, no one would give a peso for it," he sighs.

Mondino believes that the power plants have fulfilled their mission, since this year they produced 7.75 million megawatts, breaking the record of 7.2 million.

Meeting Obligations

Although the matter of energy reserves for the year 2000 is the biggest worry of CNEA scientists, other matters are also considered essential if Argentina is to join the first world.

"If we do not meet our obligations—all of our obligations—we cannot enter the international market. Today we can hardly export any fruit to Chile because we have not exterminated the Mediterranean fruit fly. For that reason, the National Institute of Agricultural-Livestock Technology (INTA) and the CNEA have signed a pact to irradiate the insect and thus prevent it from reproducing.

We estimate that when Argentina manages to eradicate the insect, the amount of fruit and vegetable exports will triple."

To make further inroads into international markets, researchers have set several goals for improvement:

- Eradicating bovine brucellosis under an agreement signed between the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Service for Animal Health (Senasa).
- Increasing exports of cobalt 60 produced in the Embalse reactor. This year, Argentina earned \$2 million on its sales of cobalt to the United States.
- Boosting the production of nuclear fuel, which accounted for earnings of \$2 million this year.

These accomplishments, together with the establishment of the School of Nuclear Medicine in Mendoza (which has been treating 35 patients a day with cobalt therapy since 9 December), the successful exploration in Chubut (where 5,000 tons of uranium was discovered), and the recent agreement on nuclear safeguards signed in Vienna by Presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello, make Manuel Mondino happy.

In his view, 1991 was a year of good fortune, "perhaps because it is a symmetrical number," he jokes. He also ventures to make a promise: "On 31 December 1992, we will drink a heavy water toast at the CNEA, because although some do not believe it, the plant will be finished by then."

Nuclear Shipment to Iran Reportedly 'Suspended'

*PY2701140092 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish
26 Jan 92 p 5*

[Text] Argentina "has suspended" a nuclear shipment to the Islamic Republic of Iran because of its "new policy" on the export of advanced technologies and because of the "concern" the commercial operation created in the United States and other Western powers.

Thomas Bush, the human resources manager of the state-owned enterprise Applied Research Institute [INVAP], has stated that this was the first shipment provided for in a \$18 million contract signed between INVAP and the Iranian Government.

Bush, who is from Rio Negro Province and a National Commission for Atomic Energy member, made it clear that the contract "has not been canceled."

Foreign Relations Under Secretary Juan Carlos Olima on the night of 26 January confirmed to CLARIN that on 22 January he met with Rio Negro Province Governor Horacio Massaccesi in Buenos Aires to tell him that the government has decided to "review all contracts" signed by INVAP with foreign countries. Olima denied that U.S. pressures prompted the government to make this decision.

Diplomatic sources consulted by CLARIN, however, confirmed the existence of U.S. pressure to suspend this

advanced technology operation with a country that Washington regards as a threat to the Middle East's security.

This is the second case with similar characteristics to the one involving the dismantling of the Condor-2 missile after Washington's pressure against the proliferation of missile production.

Olima said that the analysis of this matter will end in the next 40 days, when the final decision on whether to authorize the "nuclear shipment," will be made. He refused to reveal the content of the nuclear shipment, but INVAP personnel stated that it includes machine tools for nuclear power plants.

He explained that Argentina's "new nuclear policy" envisions the export of this type of technology under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency to those countries that also accept those checks known as "safeguards" in technical terms.

INVAP defended itself by stating that the shipment "does not include a reactor or heavy water," which are two of the major elements for the eventual construction of an atomic bomb.

Because of disagreements between Rio Negro Province and the government on this issue, the Foreign Ministry reportedly ordered the Argentine Embassy in Iran to suspend the concessions of visa requests by Iranian experts who, according to the contract, were about to visit Rio Negro to take a series of courses on the handling of the machines.

BRAZIL

Goldemberg Seeks Scientists' Support for Nuclear Accord

92SM0215Z Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 5 Jan 92 p 14

[Article by Leticia Borges]

[Text] Brasilia—Minister of Education Jose Goldemberg is seeking statements of support from Brazilian scientists for the recently signed accord between Brazil, Argentina, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The position of the Collor administration in this sector, Goldemberg says, corresponds to the "dream of a pacifist civilian government such as the scientists advocated during the military regime." Goldemberg accompanied President Fernando Collor to Vienna, where the accord was signed. "The silence of the scientists is surprising, when it should be the time to applaud," he said. According to the minister, there seems to be a certain identity of thinking between the military and some sectors of the Left when it comes to discussing the government's actions in respect to science and technology, including the nuclear variety.

Goldemberg criticized one line of thinking according to which the government is yielding Brazilian sovereignty by permitting international inspection of nuclear installations and projects, as provided in the accord with the IAEA. He cited as an example of these ideas a recent speech by Deputy Mauro Borges (PDC [Christian Democratic Party]-Goiás) that criticized the accord.

Exaggeration

In the opinion of the physicist Enio Candotti, president of the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science (SBPC), this lack of response among scientists is due to other motives, namely the preoccupation of scientists with problems such as the crisis in funding for research in Brazil and the fact that the accord was signed near the end of the year. "I realize that it is an important achievement and corresponds to long-standing recommendations on our part," Candotti says.

The physicist Candotti declares, however, that criticism associating the scientists with reactionary positions is an exaggeration. "These critics are certainly not talking about the SBPC," he insists. "I do not believe that sovereignty equates with inspection but rather with the mastery of knowledge," he says. In his view, inspection "using civilian criteria" is necessary. According to the physicist, the SBPC will shortly issue a statement on the matter .

Malevolent Theory

In Education Minister Goldemberg's view, there exists a "malevolent" theory in military sectors of various nations to the effect that the wealthy countries actually want to deny other countries access to the nuclear technologies.

This line of reasoning, Goldemberg believes, seems to have won the support of "old nationalist sectors." "Despite the fact that scientists have always advocated a world without nuclear weapons, they are allowing themselves to become enmeshed in these ideas," says the minister, who is a former president of the SBPC.

High Tech

The mere announcement of the accord with the IAEA, Goldemberg says, was sufficient to initiate removal of the barriers to Brazil's access to high-tech products. As an example he cited the University of Rio Grande do Sul, which in only one week received from the Cray supercomputers company a response to a request for consultation—a process that would normally have taken from six months to a year.

In Goldemberg's view, Brazil's status abroad has already changed. He believes that the debate has now been resolved as to the necessity for signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—one of the factors in the constant pressure that the developed countries have brought to bear on Brazil, which as a matter of principle has not

signed it. The treaty, according to Education Minister Jose Goldemberg, is considered to be discriminatory.

Interest in Russian Nuclear Experts Reported

PY2501192892 Rio de Janeiro *O GLOBO* in Portuguese
24 Jan 92 p 11

[Report by correspondent Jose Meirelles Passos from Washington]

[Text] Some Brazilian Government circles are interested in taking advantage of the Soviet Union's collapse to attract to our country highly specialized scientists and technicians—especially in the nuclear field. This issue is stirring controversy in government circles in Brasilia, and the question is that, while one group is championing such a position, there is a strong reaction from Brazilian professionals and, furthermore, personal resistance by President Fernando Collor himself.

The dilemma was disclosed by Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek during a conversation with a group of journalists at the Brazilian Embassy on the night of 22 January.

The Brazilian foreign minister commented: "There is interest in absorbing Soviet nuclear scientists, but this is a very sensitive—indeed fairly delicate—issue. We do not even like to touch much on this issue; simply mentioning it raises suspicion in many places, especially in the United States."

According to the foreign minister, Brazil would like—"Of course!"—to import professionals from the Soviet nuclear field to conduct research and other developments for peaceful uses. After all, it is highly specialized

manpower and, in a certain way, cheap. It is the beginning of a scientific drain from the old Soviet Union because, as a matter of fact, they have been liberated from the state system and are earning puny salaries. December salaries, for example, totaled the equivalent of barely \$7.

The Libyan Government was the first one to enter the field, seeking to attract the Soviets by offering \$2,000 monthly salaries. Brazil also was interested in using some of the scientists who intend to emigrate. At this moment, however, there still is not a consensus within the government.

Rezek said: "Professor (a physicist and education minister) Jose Goldemberg has already touched on this issue, mentioning it to President Collor. The issue, however, ends up being put aside because the president, at heart, is not enthusiastic about it. And his position has nothing to do with the Soviets themselves. It happens that President Collor is against nuclear energy, even for peaceful uses. He always has said that Brazil has other resources to produce energy. And, actually, those resources are cheaper than nuclear energy. Therefore, the nuclear issue is not a priority for this government."

According to the foreign minister, the absorption of Soviet scientists from other fields also is encountering barriers in Brazil. He said that many groups already have complained about the government's willingness, in principle, to take in some Soviets.

Rezek told *O GLOBO*: "It happens that there are many professionals in Brazil who are not employed in their specialty. And they are complaining about the fact that we are thinking of attracting the Russians, who are appearing on the market at a moment when many Brazilians are forced to go abroad seeking employment."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Syria, Iran Reportedly in Nuclear Weapons Pact

LD2301130792 Hamburg DPA in German 1142 GMT
23 Jan 92

[Text] Passau (DPA)—According to a report in the 'PASSAUER NEUE PRESSE' (newspaper), Syria and Iran have now signed a comprehensive agreement on strategic cooperation, which includes the sphere of nuclear weapons production. As 'PASSAUER NEUE PRESSE' reports in its Friday edition, citing "reliable sources in Paris and Lebanon," the agreement was worked out in the strictest secrecy by two working parties from the Iranian and Syrian Armed Forces. The treaty was ready for signing on 12 October 1991, but both countries postponed the signing for the time being, bearing in mind the Middle East peace conference, the newspaper said.

A Syrian military delegation headed by a general is currently conducting technical preparations for the implementation of the treaty during a visit to Tehran lasting several months, it added. Syrian efforts to acquire a nuclear power station from the People's Republic of China should also be viewed in this context, the report says.

INDIA

PRC To Cooperate in Petrochemicals Sector

BK2612102291 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0930 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] India and China have agreed to cooperate in the fields of chemicals and petrochemicals. Both the countries have also agreed to identify areas of cooperation in information on chemicals, technology transfer, training, research and development, and trade of chemicals and fertilizers between them. This was decided in a meeting when a six-member Chinese delegation called on the minister of state for chemicals and fertilizers, Dr. Chintamohan, in New Delhi today. Dr. Chintamohan informed the Chinese delegation about the development and capabilities of India's chemicals and petrochemicals sectors.

Nonproliferation Treaty Stand 'Unsustainable'

92WP0132A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 6 Jan 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Nuclear Equations"]

[Text] On the face of it, the agreement India and Pakistan have just ratified not to attack each other's nuclear facilities does little, if anything, to reduce the danger of a nuclear war between them. But it is still a landmark because it is the first step they have taken to address the problem. More will have to be taken, and much less tardily than this one which took six years to fructify from

the time the idea was first mooted by Rajiv Gandhi at a meeting with Zia-ul-Haq in December 1985. It should be clear to both countries that the world will not let them get away any more with equivocations about their nuclear intentions. Given the priority now attached to non-proliferation by the international community, the two have no choice but to find ways of allaying concerns about bombs thought to be in their arsenals. Pakistan, let us face it, has an edge in this regard because it has cleverly put the onus on India to take the lead by declaring that it will agree to any restraint that Indian policy-makers are willing to accept. New Delhi has so far based its objections to restraints on the ground that they are discriminatory (like the non-proliferation treaty) or woefully inadequate (as in the case of a regional nuclear-free zone surrounded by nuclear weapons deployed by the haves). These arguments are becoming unsustainable in the absence of any new ideas from India for alternative solutions more acceptable to it since the three-stage action plan presented by Rajiv Gandhi in mid-1988.

It is argued that it is too late to impose restraints in the South Asian context as the bombs are already in basements. But the Americans do not think so; they maintain on the basis of their intelligence findings that actual deployment can still be prevented through mutually agreed curbs. It does not matter too much whether the US assessment is wholly tenable or not. Such curbs, including the NPT, can never be fool-proof and their ultimate value is significantly dependent on the underlying political and moral commitments. In other words, there are confidence-building measures which can be fashioned in keeping with the signatories' predilections. A solemn declaration forswearing first use of horror weapons could usefully be the next on which New Delhi and Islamabad should agree since it is the one to which China will readily subscribe because it conforms with its overall nuclear posture. The two should at the same time explore options for containing the destructive potential of any conflict by pursuing the ideas already on the table for banning chemical and biological weapons and balanced force reductions. Confidence has an incremental character, and progress in any one direction will facilitate going ahead in others.

IRAN

Government, Pakistan Set for Nuclear Cooperation

NC1801145292 Beirut AL-DIYAR in Arabic
12 Jan 92 p 5

[Text] The Iraqi-based Iranian opposition group the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO] has said that Iran and Pakistan have reached an agreement on the development of nuclear weapons. The pact reportedly calls on Iran to fund the program and Pakistan to provide the expertise.

In a statement, a copy of which was received in Nicosia, the MKO claims that the agreement was signed during a

visit by Asif Nawaz, commander of the Pakistani ground forces, to Iran in November.

The statement emphasizes that Iran will fund this nuclear program to the tune of \$5 billion. Pakistan will provide the expertise in uranium enrichment.

The statement also said that China will help the two countries produce weapons systems, adding that China has sold weapons worth \$5 billion to Iran in the past three years.

The statement said that China and North Korea have helped Iran build ballistic missiles with a range of 300 km. In addition, North Korea reportedly supplied Iran with 170 Scud missiles in October and November.

The MKO statement claims that in September Iran decided to finance the establishment of Islamic regimes in the former Islamic republics of the USSR, notably in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.

Russian Nuclear Experts, Equipment Acquired

TA2101145192 (*Clandestine*) *Iran's Flag of Freedom Radio in Persian* 1630 GMT 20 Jan 92

[Text] Following the denial by officials of the Islamic Republic of the purchase of nuclear technology from the former Soviet republics, we have learned that the Tehran regime recently recruited six Russian nuclear experts.

It has also been reported that the Turkmen Republic has agreed to deliver several heavy-water laboratories and uranium enrichment equipment to the Islamic Republic. It is said in this connection that a heavy-water laboratory and one uranium-enrichment facility have already been sent to Iran and have been set up in an area near Tehran.

Ministry Denies Hiring Soviet Nuclear Scientists

LD2901111892 *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian* 1030 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] A Foreign Ministry spokesman refuted the baseless reports of some Western mass media and espionage centers that Iran has employed nuclear experts from the former Soviet Union.

He said: Such propaganda, spread with the coordination of Zionist circles, is an attempt to conceal the Zionist regime's extensive activities in nuclear arms proliferation and storage and in gaining greater access to the weapons of mass destruction. The Foreign Ministry spokesman concluded: Iran is one of the first signatories to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is one of 40 members of the disarmament commission, and has always demonstrated that it is committed to its undertakings.

ISRAEL

'Understanding' With Russia on Nuclear Plant

TA2701134792 *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew*
1300 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Professor Yuval Ne'eman today called on the government to keep tabs through its intelligence apparatus on nuclear arms activities of Algiers and Iran. He said that if it is believed that something should be done about it, he is urging the government to do it. At the same time he believes that talk of a nuclear era in the Middle East is exaggerated.

Speaking to our correspondent Shmu'el Tal, Prof. Ne'eman said that the reactor Syria ordered in the PRC and has not yet received is not more dangerous than a dentist's x-ray machine, as he put it.

Upon his resignation from the government, former Minister Ne'eman added that he has reached an understanding with the Russians concerning the construction of a nuclear power station in Israel. Russia will sell Israel the heavy parts of the nuclear station. The other parts will be developed in Israel and perhaps even sold to Russia.

LIBYA

U.S. Concern Over Nuclear Projects 'Unfounded'

LD2501123892 *Tripoli JANA in Arabic* 1133 GMT
25 Jan 92

[Text] Tripoli 25 Jan (JANA)—JANA's local affairs editor has described statements by Peter (?Ewing), the U.S. State Department's coordinator for the fight against terrorism—in which he asserted that the United States is very concerned with the possibility that Libya might hire a number of Russian nuclear scientists—as unfounded claims that fall within the framework of the campaign by imperialist circles against the Libyan Arab people. The editor added that the world has become accustomed to the reiteration of such claims which seek to mislead international public opinion and distort the Great Jamahiriyyah's stands.

He added that the Great Jamahiriyyah has repeatedly and continuously reaffirmed that it is against the possession of weapons of destruction and that it has not [words indistinct] the programs of manufacturing atomic and chemical weapons. He said that the fact that U.S. officials continue to invoke the name of the Great Jamahiriyyah quite clearly reflects the extent of rancor and hatred against the Libyan people and the search for pretexts and excuses to strike against the the Libyan people's achievements and obstruct its internal development. JANA's local affairs editor concluded: The Great Jamahiriyyah is always concerned and committed to implementing the agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it calls on U.S. officials—if they are really anxious about the proliferation of nuclear

weapons—to condemn the nuclear programs of Israel, which has thus far refused to sign the agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby defying all international resolutions and the will of the international community.

Bureau Denies German Nuclear Shipment Accusation

*LD2401212592 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1930 GMT
24 Jan 92*

[Text] Tripoli, 24 Jan (JANA)—Following a statement by the German Government spokesman on 22 January 1992 concerning the interception at Frankfurt Airport of a consignment of nuclear materials in transit from the United States of America to Libya via Frankfurt, the People's Bureau for External Liaison and International Cooperation summoned the German ambassador to the Great Jamahiriya. It expressed to him the deep astonishment of the Libyan authorities at the statement by the German Government because it knows that the United States is maintaining a total economic boycott of Libya, and that it is impossible to send any cargo from the United States to Libya, particularly this type of cargo. He was also told that Libya has no interest in such activities and that the whole matter is no more than a total fabrication by Western intelligence to tarnish the reputation of the Jamahiriya, especially in the present circumstances.

PAKISTAN

Minister Says France Seeks Nuclear Aid Safeguards

BK1901095692 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Overseas Service in English 0800 GMT 19 Jan 92

[Text] The prime minister's talks with President Mitterrand [words indistinct] ministers of foreign affairs, defense, trade, and commerce. France supported the Pakistani prime minister's proposal of 6 June last year for nonproliferation in South Asia. This was stated by the minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr. Mohammad Siddique Kanjoo, in Islamabad today. He said the question of supply of nuclear power plant by France to Pakistan is still open, but France wanted special safeguards as it had announced to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT].

Mr. Siddique Kanjoo emphasized that Pakistan also wanted safeguards, but said it cannot sign the NPT unilaterally. He said for this purpose Pakistan has proposed the nonproliferation conference for South Asia as it strictly believed in nonproliferation. He pointed out that India was refusing to sign the NPT despite the fact that the entire world knew India's nuclear program as it detonated a nuclear device as [far] back as in 1974, whereas the United States has only unfounded apprehensions about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program. He said

India is the only country which is not supporting the Pakistani proposal of nonproliferation in South Asia.

Spokesman on French Nuclear Pact; India, Japan

BK2901154792 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu 1500 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] A Foreign Office spokesman said in Islamabad today that Pakistan and France have agreed in principle to sign the agreement for cooperation in the field of nuclear technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement was reached during the prime minister's recent visit to France. The spokesman, however, added that details in this regard are yet to be finalized.

When asked to comment on efforts by India and Japan to become permanent members of the UN Security Council, the spokesman said Pakistan feels that the Security Council is working effectively after the end of the Cold War and the easing of international tension. There is no justification for an expansion in the permanent membership of the UNSC at this juncture, because such an expansion may prove counterproductive.

SUDAN

Iran Supplying Silkworm Missiles, F-7 Aircraft

Military Source Confirms

*NC2201204592 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic
19 Jan 92 p 9*

[From the "Brothers" page]

[Text] Sudanese military sources have confirmed to the "Brothers" page that Iran supplied the ruling regime in Khartoum with Silkworm missiles and Chinese-made F-7 aircraft. Iran also allocated \$20 million for the Popular Arab Islamic Conference led by Hasan al-Turabi.

In another development, Iranian Majles member Ahmad 'Azizi arrived in Khartoum last week leading a high-level parliamentary delegation to take part in the conference organized by the Khartoum government for the opponents of the Middle East peace process.

Further on Military Cooperation

*PM1601093492 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
13 Jan 92 p 1*

[Safa Ha'iri report: "Is Tehran Supplying Khartoum With Missiles and Aircraft?"]

[Excerpts] Paris—Tehran has sent Ahmad 'Azizi, member of the Shura Council (parliament) and former head of the council's Foreign Affairs Committee, to Khartoum at the head of a parliamentary delegation to participate in the conference "in support of the Muslim Palestinian people's revolution," which opposes the present peace process in the Middle East. Meanwhile, new information has revealed that the military and

economic cooperation agreements between Iran and Sudan include provisions for the supply to Khartoum of Silkworm missiles and Chinese-made F-7 aircraft. [passage omitted]

Informed Iranian sources have told AL-HAYAH that Hashemi-Rafsanjani's visit resulted in an agreement under which Tehran would supply Khartoum with military equipment worth \$20 million, most of it Iranian-made. It includes ammunition, bombs, semi-heavy military equipment, guns, and surface-to-surface Silkworm missiles made in China and assembled in Iran.

Other reports which have not yet been corroborated indicate that Iran has probably supplied Sudan with Chinese F-7 aircraft, which military experts say are equal in performance to the Soviet MiG-19.

Diplomats in Paris have been quoted as saying that during its talks in Khartoum last month the Iranian side advised Sudanese officials, including President 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir and [National Islamic Front leader] Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, to "leave the non-Muslim (Sudanese) South to its poverty and fragmentation and to concentrate instead on the Muslim North and the Horn of Africa region." [passage omitted]

FRG, U.S. Differ on CIS Tactical Nuclear Arms

*PM2001111792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jan 92 Morning Edition pp 1, 4*

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "No Unity in West Over USSR's Nuclear Legacy"]

[Excerpts] In ceasing to exist the Soviet Union has left behind it a terrible legacy—30,000 nuclear warheads on the territory of virtually all the former Soviet republics.

All Western capitals are wondering the same thing today—What should be done to lessen the threat from the arsenal inherited by the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]? But they have hitherto been unable to find a common answer to this question.

Last week the FRG Government submitted for the attention of its North Atlantic bloc partners its vision of ways of solving this problem, and this gave rise to disagreements among NATO members.

What did Bonn propose? In the opinion of the German Government, NATO should enter into talks on the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal with all CIS states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. In Bonn's opinion, an agreement must be concluded with each of them on destroying all tactical nuclear arms. Moreover, all members of the disbanded Warsaw Pact must also be involved in the negotiating process within the framework of the recently created North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Bonn's proposal was assessed positively by Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, who recently paid an official visit to the FRG. However, Washington saw Bonn's intention of binding all possessors of nuclear weapons within the CIS by pledges made by their present governments as threatening to slow down the disarmament process started by President George Bush and former USSR President M. Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

Now that the USSR no longer exists the Americans reckon that the FRG's proposal will send the independent states the "wrong signals." In other words, Washington is afraid that the new sovereigns may regard the German initiative as an invitation to discuss the issue of tactical arms, which has already been decided.

Washington is pressing for the continuation of dialogue on nuclear issues on a bilateral basis between the United States and the CIS or Russia, which in the future must remain the only heir to the former USSR's nuclear might. [passage omitted]

The "cold war" fear of a possible Soviet nuclear strike has changed its nature today and has turned into fear of the unpredictable development of events in the CIS that have both strategic and tactical nuclear arms on their territory. The signals from us are too contradictory and the situation taking shape in and among the independent states is too unstable, and this will quite obviously

prompt the West to formulate a common approach on the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy in the near future.

France's Dumas Probes CIS Nuclear Safety

*PM2801091592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Elmar Guseynov report: "Roland Dumas Expresses Concern"]

[Text] The shadow of alarm provoked in the West by the inadequate security of nuclear facilities in the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] has still not been completely dispelled. This was one of the main conclusions of the visit to the four nuclear republics of the CIS by French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas which ended 26 January.

Control over nuclear weapons and civilian atomic facilities, the problem of "brain drain" in the sphere of nuclear technologies, and also the economic problems of the former USSR—these were the main topics of R. Dumas' conversations with the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus. All the signs suggest that the French minister has not overcome, as a result of these talks, existing fears over the vagueness of the status of nuclear facilities on the territory of the former USSR.

Above all, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev refuted the claims of B. Yeltsin and Ye. Shaposhnikov, who in the course of meetings in Moscow assured R. Dumas that accords had been reached within the CIS on the transfer in the near future of the entire strategic nuclear arsenal from the other republics to Russian territory, with the aim of subsequently destroying it. The Kazakhstan president also recalled the fact that single control over the strategic forces of the former USSR is supposed to be maintained in line with the Minsk accords. He gave to understand that Kazakhstan does not intend to part with the strategic nuclear forces situated on its territory in the immediate future.

At the same time, N. Nazarbayev said that Kazakhstan will strictly observe all agreements in the sphere of arms reductions and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons concluded in the past by USSR leaders. The Kazakhstan president in conversation with R. Dumas refuted the rumors of an exodus from the republic to other countries of nuclear specialists and nuclear technology.

The French foreign minister's talks with the leaders of the Ukraine and Belarus turned out to be significantly more reassuring. These republics are showing a readiness to withdraw strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from their territories in the immediate future. On one condition, however: The withdrawal of weapons and their subsequent destruction on Russian soil must be monitored by representatives from Kiev and Minsk.

Interestingly, in his final press conference at the end of his visit, R. Dumas devoted a considerable amount of

time to talking about the adoption in the CIS of a decisionmaking system on the use of nuclear weapons. He claims that the "nuclear briefcase" is in the hands of the Russian president alone. However, he is able to make a decision to press the lethal button only after consulting the leaders of the other nuclear republics on a special "black telephone."

Although as a result of the visit protocols were signed on the opening of French diplomatic missions in the capitals which R. Dumas visited, and also on cooperation in the economic sphere and in the sphere of control over the security of civilian nuclear facilities, the general tone of early commentaries of Western observers is not too optimistic. News captions have highlighted as being of most importance R. Dumas' statement to the effect that the problem of nuclear security in the CIS is "far from being settled."

Russian Ministry Views Uranium Production, Sales

*924P0053B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jan 92 Morning edition p 2*

[Article by Sergey Leskov: "Russia Is Proposing a Significant Increase in Uranium Exports"]

[Text] For the first time, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry has publicized a very curious and formerly strictly secret statistic. About 45 percent of the world's proven uranium reserves are found in the territory of the former USSR. But our share of the world uranium export market is significantly smaller—about 5 to 6 percent. At the present time, in the opinion of A. Shishkin, general director of the joint-stock company "Tekhsnabeksprom," Russia could lay claim to a 20 to 25 percent share of world exports. What treasury receipts may be expected as a result? In 1991, the export of nuclear fuel at a price of \$22-23 per kilogram of natural uranium yielded a half billion for us. Russia is striving to increase exports to \$1.5 billion.

Regretfully it must be recognized that the nuclear department did not reveal the statistic, including production expenditures, out of good living. Our plans to expand exports went against the interests of large corporations of the United States and Western Europe. In the United States, where there are already two large depots for Soviet uranium, a group of mining companies made a statement to the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission to the effect that uranium from the former USSR is being sold to the United States at prices lower than the cost of production. In other words, we are engaged in a dumping policy and are harming American fuel sectors. Those making this claim were supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, which has exclusive rights with respect to the operation of enriching enterprises. If the claim is recognized to be just, then the U.S. Government will set higher customs duties on imports of our uranium, which will deprive enterprises of the Commonwealth of Independent States

of access to the world market on the basis of free competition. Another unpleasant surprise was the refusal of Euroatom to affirm a number of contracts on the sale of our uranium to European consumers.

As explained by A. Shishkin as well as Ye. Mikerin, chief of the Main Technological Directorate MAEP, all of our mining enterprises are operating under the principles of the market economy and have long since been getting along without state subsidies that would permit the artificial maintenance of dumping prices for uranium. Expenditures are lowered not only because of the relatively low level of wages but also on account of advanced technology. A processing plant in Yekaterinburg recently made such a favorable impression on those same Americans that they signed a contract for the delivery of enriched uranium through the year 2000.

All of this, in the opinion of our specialists, makes it possible to categorically reject all accusations of a dumping policy in the Western market. Another explanation of the dispute seems more convincing: the reluctance to admit a new and very dangerous competitor to the world market. Regretfully it must be recognized that this is nothing new: other branches comparable to world standards are also encountering similar obstacles in their attempt to enter the broad market. The conclusion may be drawn that it is more advantageous for the West to give us humanitarian aid, even generous assistance, than to allow us to become stronger and feed ourselves.

Meanwhile, it is dangerous to play such games with uranium. In the event of economic sanctions by developed countries, uranium can be sold profitably in the Asian region, where it will be difficult for the IAEA to exercise any sort of control at all. It is essential to consider that although the entire production of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium is located in the territory of Russia, reserves of natural uranium in the former USSR are distributed as follows: 30 percent each in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan and 10 percent in Ukraine. News agencies have already been reporting on the sale of the nuclear technologies of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It turned out that this is disinformation. But there is no guarantee that the invention will not soon become reality if the established economic ties are shut down.

Nuclear Brain Drain Issue Causes 'Anxiety'

*News Conference Held
PM2801125892 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Jan 92 First Edition p 7*

[“Commentary” by Sergey Panasenko: “About the Nuclear Rumors”]

[Text] Rumors that nuclear technologies from the former USSR are “spreading” around the “Third World” countries along with experts who had access to nuclear secrets are without foundation. So said Andrey Gagarinskiy, deputy director of the Atomic Energy Institute, at a news

conference at the institute. He knows of only two nuclear scientists who have left the country other than through official channels (one to Israel and one to the FRG), and neither of them is now doing serious work in his field.

However, he gave no guarantees that a spontaneous leak of nuclear technologies from Russia to the neighboring states will not take place in the future, especially in view of the dire circumstances of scientific institutions and scientists. "The former barriers in the shape of special institutions that used to prevent exits now scarcely exist," Andrey Gagarinskiy said, "and it is no problem for a good specialist to leave."

And it is becoming clear that there is somewhere for them to go. It is not only that a large number of "third world" countries are actively pursuing their own nuclear research programs. The fact is that in a number of countries those programs were set up and developed with the active participation and support of the USSR, and thus Soviet nuclear scientists may well feel "at home" in Libya, Iraq, or Cuba.

Specialists at the Atomic Energy Institute who were present at the press conference assured us with one voice that the reactors built with our participation in interesting countries like Libya and Iraq are not suitable for the production of uranium for bombs. It would be nice to believe that. But it cannot be denied that the knowledge acquired in the course of building and servicing these reactors could be used successfully to create and service far more powerful installations.

Vladimir Panin, a laboratory chief at the Atomic Energy Institute who was personally responsible for the construction of reactors at the Libyan research center, admitted that it never occurred to him or his colleagues to ask: Why does a country like Libya need its own atomic center? Does the capacity of some of our professionals to avoid asking too many questions of themselves and those around them explain why leaders like al-Qadhafi and Husayn tend to choose Soviet nuclear scientists?

U.S. Prevention Tactics

PM2801102192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "United States Ready To Pay Former Union Nuclear Scientists"]

[Text] The United States intends to recruit around 2,000 nuclear scientists in the former Soviet Union to ensure that they do not work for countries such as Libya and Iran.

Citing sources in the Bush administration, the LOS ANGELES TIMES states that the United States intends to pay for their work in scrapping Soviet nuclear weapons and their involvement in research aimed at the peaceful use of nuclear power.

Officials in the Bush administration and members of the U.S. Congress fear that other countries seeking to create their own nuclear arsenal might recruit leading specialists in the sphere of nuclear research work in Russia and other republics of the former USSR.

Addressing a U.S. Senate subcommittee, CIA Director Robert Gates warned that the collapse of the former superpower could create a "potentially dangerous brain drain."

It is intended to incorporate the expenditure on implementing U.S. plans regarding the scientists of the former USSR in the \$400 million which the U.S. Congress is appropriating for dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal. AP also reports plans to create a multinational consortium which will see to it that nuclear scientists find work in the sphere of nuclear research in the former Soviet Union and the West.

Western Anxieties Cited

PM2801140392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Maksim Gan: "CIA and Mossad Have Agreed Together To Keep an Eye on Our Nuclear Scientists"]

[Text] The problem of the "brain drain" and the leak of nuclear technologies from the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries is causing growing concern in the West. According to assessments by the French Institute of International Studies, between 3,000 and 5,000 Soviet scientists had access to nuclear technology. Several dozen of these are already working in Israel, nine in the United States, and two in Germany.

Western experts believe that the possible use of nuclear scientists by countries in the Near East, particularly Libya and Iran, poses a far greater danger than the proliferation of nuclear weapons themselves.

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner said in an interview with the magazine BUNTE that, according to available information, some CIS nuclear scientists have already received an invitation to work in other countries. He believes that urgent measures must be taken and that all former defense industry workers must be provided with highly-paid work.

While acknowledging that it is extremely complex to prevent nuclear scientists from leaving the former Soviet Union, Western experts propose keeping a strict account of not only nuclear warheads but also scientists.

The French newspaper LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE has reported that the United States and Israel have adopted a decision to establish close cooperation between their special services in order to monitor nuclear scientists living on the territory of the former USSR. Agents of the CIA and of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence, have begun intensified surveillance of specialists in the sphere of creating weapons of mass

destruction, particularly on the territory of Central Asian republics, the newspaper maintains.

'Seriously Alarmed'

PM2801164392 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Report by A. Goncharov; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Goncharov] The feeling of relief in the West following lifting the Soviet military threat was short-lived. German Foreign Minister Genscher is already talking about the emergence of the most acute problem since the end of the "cold war." The problem in question is the fate of our nuclear arms specialists—scientists and engineers alike. Iranian emigres in Paris claim that the director of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Company has already hired a number of Soviet nuclear specialists, offering them a monthly salary of \$20,000 and a \$60,000 relocation allowance. NATO Secretary General Woerner has admitted that he has received information to this effect.

The West is seriously alarmed at the prospect of nuclear weapons being produced in the Third World. Its response can be expected within the next few days. Economic assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States republics may be made conditional on rigorous control over Soviet nuclear technology and specialists. The White House is looking into a proposal to hire 2,000 of our nuclear specialists for the program to dismantle nuclear warheads. Genscher favors the establishment of an international foundation to retrain Soviet defense industry specialists. This problem may be raised in the UN Security Council. While in London, New York, and Ottawa, Yeltsin will have to furnish specific answers to the fears of his partners in the talks.

Meanwhile, the French JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE writes, agents of the CIA and Mossad, the Israeli secret service, are already closely shadowing Soviet specialists in the field of mass destruction weapons, especially on the territory of Central Asian Republics.

Report of Nuclear Bomb Sales to Iran Viewed

NC2501101792 Moscow Radio Moscow in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Sergey Viktorov commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners. Yuliy Vorontsov, the Russian Federation's UN representative, denied reports that Iran had purchased three Soviet nuclear bombs.

A Paris-based, Arabic-language magazine carried a sensational report that Iran had purchased three nuclear bombs and invited 50 former Soviet experts [to Iran], and more precisely, from one of the Muslim-inhabited republics. The name of the republic was not mentioned.

It is quite possible this news would have prompted the expected reaction in social circles. This (?rumor) that the

republics of the former Soviet Union are selling nuclear arms and thus are trampling on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which the Soviet Union had signed, naturally would be spread in a conducive atmosphere. This is because people all over the world are extremely concerned about the fate of the Soviet Union.

As you can see, in these circumstances the Russian Federation, as the legitimate heir of the Soviet Union, was forced to take an official step at the highest level. Russian UN Representative Yuliy Vorontsov announced that such reports [of nuclear weapons sales] are unfounded.

The (?circulation) of this baseless report in Paris was not difficult at all. It is not even necessary to reiterate the remarks of the Armed Forces general commanders or CIS politicians to keep assuring the world that nuclear arms are under reliable control. The issue is that none of those former Soviet republics, which usually are termed Muslim-inhabited republics, have nuclear arms that they can sell to a third party without being subject to control.

As for Kazakhstan, which has nuclear weapons, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev cherishes the credibility of his republic. He never would enter into dubious transactions over nuclear weapons. In addition, if someone today were to ask Kazakhstan to cheat on the nuclear weapons issue, he would get nowhere.

After all, in Kazakhstan, as in all other former Soviet republics, these weapons are rigorously controlled by the Armed Forces, and non-military officials do not have access to them. At present, it is not known what the Paris magazine's source of information was in disseminating the report on the (?illicit) sale of Soviet nuclear weapons to Iran. Similarly, the objective of publishing such a report is not very clear. It may not be too far-fetched, however, that those behind this could be the ones who stand to gain from undermining the credibility of the newly forged relations between the CIS countries and Tehran.

Swift Solutions Needed To Stem Brain Drain

LD2801103692 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Correspondent Nikolay Ivanov report from Kurchatov Institute, from the "Itogi" program presented by Yevgeniy Kiselev]

[Excerpts] [Kiselev] How is it possible to prevent the drain of scientists with knowledge of the technology for creating nuclear weapons from the former USSR to countries striving to obtain them? How serious is this threat, which the whole world's press was talking about last week?

[Ivanov] Kurchatov [Soviet nuclear physicist Igor Vasilevich Kurchatov, 1903-60, founder of the Kurchatov

Institute] would most probably have regarded the proposal to create nuclear weapons somewhere in Libya or Iraq as an insult. However, today's nuclear physicists, who have lost their elite status are being compelled to contemplate such questions. According to the estimates of the CIA Director, about one million people are engaged in implementing the nuclear programs of the former USSR, and 2,000 have knowledge enabling them to develop nuclear weapons.

At the Institute of Atomic Energy they believe the latter figure to be rather larger, approximately 10,000. [passage omitted] However, we have learned from competent sources that there are still restrictions on persons possessing secret information from leaving the country, not only to take up permanent residence but even on contract.

Ways of resolving the crisis lie somewhere between the state subsidizing nuclear scientists and the idea of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev on the setting up of a Russian-Western support fund. Some experts believe that the IAEA should be urged to finance civilian nuclear programs in the Commonwealth of Independent States and that the best alternative for security would be the setting up of a nuclear (?pool) under UN auspices.

Can nuclear traders be kept under control? While this question used to be purely hypothetical, at the beginning of January an offer appeared on a Moscow exchange for the sale of a complete nuclear reactor. Even if most nuclear scientists turn out to be altruists and patriots, there will always be some people for whom a couple of thousand dollars will seem more tempting than 10 a month.

It is clear that where it is a case of contracts abroad, there are fewer and fewer lyricists among the physicists. Given these circumstances, blanket surveillance of potential nuclear mercenaries or a ban on foreign travel are unlikely to have a powerful effect. The one thing that does concern specialists in nuclear power engineering today is that direct state financing or the setting up of various funds should take place quite quickly.

Scraping of Tactical Nuclear Arms Possible

LD2501190192 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Jan 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast—read by announcer]

[Text] When he meets President Bush in Washington in a week's time, Russian President Boris Yeltsin may propose the complete scrapping of tactical nuclear armaments.

Chemical Weapons Elimination Group Formed

LD2801124792 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
2359 GMT 27 Jan 92

[From the "Military News" section]

[Text] According to some sources, a state committee for elimination of chemical weapons will be created in Russia in early February. According to the sources close to the Russian Foreign Ministry, it will include specialists from the former departments, which were in charge of their development and production. Russia will do the main part of work in the elimination of chemical weapons. However, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to make some financial contribution for the solution of this problem.

Kurchatov Official Dismisses Brain Drain Issue

PM2301162992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by K. Belyaninov: "If Someone Wants Our Nuclear Bombs, We Have No Inkling at the Moment"]

[Text] Despite the chronic absence of sausage and hard currency, there is one thing the former Soviet Union was never short of—nuclear potential. We always worked enthusiastically on its development and even allowed surpluses to go abroad. The other day, for example, it turned out that a scandal had erupted in the United States over the appearance of a large quantity of our enriched uranium at incredibly low prices on the U.S. market. Then there were rumors of our nuclear people appearing en masse at "facilities" in Libya and Iraq, and an equally massive sale of nuclear weapon parts.

"They are no more than rumors," A. Gagarinskiy, deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy, assured us at yesterday's news conference. "Our staff are working in Libya, but we are talking about a government agreement rather than emigrants."

Apparently, the former Soviet Union still has something to offer the Western market. Our uranium enrichment technology is considered the best and most economical in the world, and we have been sharing our experience in the field of nuclear physics and reactor technology ever since 1975. As a result, 26 nuclear power station units constructed by Soviet specialists are still operating in a wide variety of countries.

Soviet scientists have been engaged in entirely legal nuclear research in Third World countries. For example, we have built research reactors in Egypt, Iraq, and Vietnam. We have nearly finished constructing a Nuclear Research Center in Cuba and our specialists have been working at a similar center in Libya since 1977, having already trained "over 200 Libyan specialists."

But there was no answer at the news conference to the question whether one can expect nuclear weapons to appear in Libya in the very near future. All that was said was that the reactors there are purely research reactors and it is practically impossible to use them to produce weapons-grade plutonium, while any decent physicist with a sound education can make a bomb in the right conditions.

But one should not talk of charity, let alone "fraternal assistance," A. Gagarinskiy claimed. The cooperation is based on a normal commercial footing and brings in \$26 million per year. Incidentally, the first personal computers were bought for the Kurchatov Institute with "Libyan" money.

Institute specialists have not yet received any offers from foreign centers. But despite this, they do not rule out the possibility of a brain drain, particularly as the former exit bans applied to physicists working in secret fields no longer operate. Nonetheless the Kurchatov Institute has recorded only two emigrants in the past two years. But, according to the Institute's data, they did not find work.

Vorontsov Denies Nuclear Arms Sales to Iran

*LD2401083692 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0400 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[Text] Vorontsov, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation at the United Nations, has denied reports that Iran acquired three nuclear arms in one of the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Vorontsov told the ASSOCIATED PRESS agency that not a single nuclear weapon from the former Soviet arsenal had been sold to third countries.

A report about the sales appeared in the Paris-based Arab weekly AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI. It said that last year, having availed itself of the instability in the Soviet Union, Iran acquired three bombs and paid between \$130 million and \$150 million. The report pointed out that Iran had also hired more than 50 nuclear specialists from the USSR to assemble the components of these bombs and offered them a monthly salary of \$5,000.

The magazine did not directly state where the parts of the bombs were obtained. It was, however, stated that it was an Islamic republic. According to ASSOCIATED PRESS, it is obvious that Kazakhstan was meant here.

So, none of that corresponds to reality, according to Vorontsov.

Nuclear 'Inheritance' of USSR Causes 'Alarm'

*PM2301135392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Vladimir Mikheyev report: "UN Security Council Convenes in Emergency Session. The Nuclear Disintegration of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Causes Alarm in the World"]

[Text] The degree of uncertainty associated with the nuclear inheritance of the disintegrated USSR is perhaps comparable to the alarm felt by the world community.

British Prime Minister John Major admitted candidly in a television interview that "the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and future disarmament... is one of the reasons why I have convened a special emergency session

of the UN Security Council." Wednesday sees the start of a visit to our country by a delegation from the Pentagon, whose experts will carry out an on-the-spot assessment of the best way to spend the \$400 million earmarked by Congress for the elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons. Let us remind readers that similar technical assistance was mentioned by British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd, who has just visited Alma-Ata, Kiev, and Moscow, and who was basically paving the way for the emergency session of the UN Security Council.

Physicist I. Chernyayev in Libya's Awbari Desert

Finding a common language with the statesmen who represent the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] is being taken seriously by Western leaders, and there are no particular complications. It is another thing entirely to prevent the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons from being undermined, not by the sovereign republics that make up the CIS, but by some of their citizens, the ones who, in the past, were most directly associated with the establishment of the USSR's military nuclear industry and whose social status and material prosperity are currently plummeting. According to information supplied by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, there are at least 200,000 of them.

"If someone earns \$10 a month but is offered \$2,000 a month somewhere in Algeria or Libya, this looks very tempting," Cal Wood, a scientist from Livermore who took part in a conference on the theme "The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the End of the Soviet Empire" that was held here in California, believes. Yesterday they were the elite of the defense industry. Today they are "out-of-work scientists" with no prospects. The problem has been identified. At Livermore they suggested giving aid for conversion, financial injections, and even providing job placement for some of the scientists in developed Western countries. But all this is looking to the future.

Today, meanwhile, as the British newspaper THE SUNDAY EXPRESS reported, physicist I. Chernyayev has been working at a secret installation in the Awbari Desert in Libya since mid-September 1991. He earns \$60,000 a year, not counting free housing and cars. According to the same unconfirmed report, three other Russian nuclear specialists are working alongside him, offering their intellect for... "the Muslim nuclear bomb."

Is the Cork in the Bottle Containing the Nuclear Genie Sealed Tightly?

Looking at the list of all the West's concerns, and discounting factors like a "lone maniac" or a treacherous dictator capable of getting his hands on doomsday weapons, there remains the problem of reliability such as, the reliability of the technology for destroying nuclear munitions in line with international agreements; the reliability of transporting them, for example, from Ukraine to Russia; and the reliability of storage facilities. Also along this chain is the reliability of "service personnel."

While in Moscow, D. Hurd received assurances from Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of CIS Armed Forces, that technical aid from the West would be welcomed. The news agencies recalled in this context the words of V. Shlykov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Defense of Russia, who made the following disturbing confession: Bearing in mind the transportation and storage methods that we use, there is a growing threat of radioactive plutonium leakage. For his part, French Defense Minister P. Joxe expressed doubt about the "psychological" maturity of the commanders who are answerable for the tactical nuclear weapons entrusted to them.

Missiles and Debts in One Bunch

J. Attali, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, brought an unexpected and even paradoxical idea with him to Moscow: Nuclear weapons in exchange for foreign debt burden relief, in other words, the dismantling of nuclear missiles would be linked to a slackening of the debt noose (which stands at \$60-70 billion).

Although the proposal put forward by J. Attali was not made in his capacity as head of the bank but in an individual capacity, it is nonetheless attractive. Linkage of this sort could be just what we need, since it would be better to fill in the nuclear abyss and the debt pit at the same time.

Quick Elimination of Nuclear Arsenal Urged

PM2301153392 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
23 Jan 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Sergey Blagovolin, president of the independent Russian Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies, by Sergey Guk; place and date not given: "NATO Can Be the Guarantor of Russia's Security"]

[Text] [Guk] British Prime Minister J. Major recently advocated that the UN Security Council should tackle the problem of the former USSR's nuclear arsenals. To all appearances, people in the West do not have very much faith in the ability of the leaders of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to keep the situation under control. It turns out that they want virtually to place us under international tutelage—which is offensive. Have things really come to this?

[Blagovolin] It is possible not to be concerned about the fate of our nuclear arsenals in the immediate future. Unless there is a slide toward chaos, it is possible to rely on the guarantees of the CIS leaders. However, it would be a sign of quite unjustified optimism to believe that the worst has already passed us by.

[Guk] What really threatens the nuclear potential of the former USSR?

[Blagovolin] Is it really not clear? People in our country are today seizing military weapons dumps—who will

guarantee that things will not go so far as missiles and warheads? Of course, terrorists will not succeed in launching a strategic missile, but they are quite capable of destroying warheads with subsequent contamination of the locality. Adventurers could do anything they like with tactical weapons that fall into their hands. This is why it is important to eliminate them as quickly as possible.

[Guk] Are the forecasts not too somber?

[Blagovolin] Nothing must be ruled out in hotbeds of mass disturbances and military conflicts. The leakage of "know-how" and brains to foreign countries is equally real. I cannot at present see any barrier that would halt the outflow of specialists. The example of Iraq is in the public eye. It would be tragic if our collapse played a fateful role in creating new regions of instability in the world.

[Guk] In our own home above all. Instead of pooling resources in the struggle against economic disaster, many CIS leaders are devoting all their efforts to the struggle to take the Armed Forces apart.

[Blagovolin] I agree. Even after signing the Minsk agreements, each of the republics has set about making its own interpretation of them. They want, let us assume, to create their own armed forces—a perfectly legitimate desire. But why always by "annexing" entire units and garrisons, regardless of the fact that this could have very grave consequences and undermine the foundations of security? Disregarding the wishes of many servicemen, in respect of whom they use threats and promises to make them take a new oath? You must not, after all, "confiscate" living people!

It Will Be Decided During the Year Whether There Will Be a Dictatorship in Russia

[Guk] It is all in the spirit of the accords: The CIS is not a state and, consequently, there must not be unified Armed Forces, must there?

[Blagovolin] I cannot understand why there is such haste. Serious discontent is swelling in the Armed Forces, as no one is taking account of the interests of servicemen and their families—these are many millions of people—in the breakup that is taking place, and they are being cut to the quick. This is wrong. Military people are not puppets. You must not endlessly abuse the long-suffering people who hold weapons. Forces which dream of restoring the former usages might take advantage of their discontent.

[Guk] Maybe people in the republics are in such a hurry because they fear a new coup in Moscow and are afraid that they will once again be driven into a socialist camp—with the emphasis on the last word?

[Blagovolin] If they fear a putsch...Well, I can say to this that the question of whether or not there will be a dictatorship will be decided very soon. During this year.

[Guk] Why such conviction?

[Blagovolin] It is perfectly obvious that, if the reforms which Russia is now implementing do not fail and are not torpedoed and if there is not a social explosion—largely a provoked one (which I fear)—then no coup is foreseen. I will say more and even risk being misinterpreted. The fate of democracy in all parts of the former Union now depends on how things go in Russia. The leaders of all the CIS countries and the Baltic states must understand this. Remember the three days of the August putsch: The events in Moscow elicited a funeral knell in all the republics. All were rooted to the spot, as it were, and nobody protested. I will repeat yet again—the fate of the former Union is today being decided in Russia. If it holds out, the others will also have their own future; if not, no customs and borders will save the day. It will all be decided quite quickly.

Prescription for Salvation: Destroy Tactical Weapons, Hand Over Strategic Weapons to Russia

[Guk] Let us return to our starting position. How, in these troubled times, are we to secure ourselves and the rest of the world against “surprises” connected with the possible loss of control over at least a part of the nuclear arsenals?

[Blagovolin] Tactical weapons must be destroyed, and the rest handed over to Russia. People wrongly think that nuclear weapons are a kind of privilege; they are a heavy burden. In this sense Russia is, by dint of objective factors, the Union's heir. So let these weapons be concentrated in Russia. Are some of the new leaders really afraid of nuclear blackmail by Moscow?

[Guk] Blackmail or no blackmail, still Leonid Kravchuk has announced his intention to eliminate nuclear weapons in Ukraine and made it clear that he would be happier to see Russia nuclear-free too....

[Blagovolin] I have always been opposed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, at any rate in the foreseeable future. This can only be done after the creation of a global system of mutual guarantees, for otherwise we could become the hostages of some other Saddam Husayn or alliance of dictators. We have entered a period of new global instability. Russia must become part of the international security structure, and as such the world still needs us as a nuclear power. We must not rely on the United States' maintaining security for us, as it did for everyone in the Persian Gulf. Being an integrated part of a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok means fulfilling certain obligations, including the maintenance of modern armed forces.

[Guk] Pardon me, but who has invited us?

[Blagovolin] The West, which is already ready for a phased transition to such a security system. One thing is holding it back—it is not clear what might happen in our country tomorrow. What is needed is internal stabilization in Russia and a full revision of the concept of

national security with due regard for the fact that there is no longer a threat from NATO. NATO today is our natural ally. We must build a bridge between Moscow and Brussels more quickly. If necessary, over the heads of those who are not yet ready for this. It is time to abandon our absurd fears of NATO's approach to our borders. The North Atlantic Alliance is now, if you like, the guarantor of our security. If we could join it today, this would be the best option for us from the viewpoint of ensuring our security. But, for this, it is necessary first to ensure a certain compatibility of structures and of the nature of military activity, openness, and civilian control. New people must appear in the Army leadership who do not take the old view of NATO as the enemy. Particularly as there are, alas, many real threats. The more quickly we travel the path of creating a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the better. No one is capable of touching such a cumbersome thing.

The World Needs Russia As a Nuclear Power

[Guk] One small thing is lacking: stability in Russia. How can this be achieved?

[Blagovolin] By using presidential power to instill order. It is not a question of a dictatorship but of a power under which people are obliged to fulfill the laws that exist. I do not know of a more democratic country than the United States, but just let someone there try to accomplish just one-hundredth part of what is being done in our country. Democracy means responsibility, not anarchy and chaos. Our great compatriot Solzhenitsyn rightly said: It is possible to descend from the heights of totalitarianism only with the reins held tight. I do not rule out the possibility that in a number of cases it will be necessary to go over to direct rule in the provinces, like rule by a governor.

[Guk] But where are the legally elected soviets to go?

[Blagovolin] They are to suspend activities if they wreck the reforms. This is what Gorbachev should have done.

[Guk] That is, a coup from above, after the pattern set by Yanayev, Pavlov, and Kryuchkov?

[Blagovolin] The word coup is inappropriate here. I am talking about a concentration of power, only not against the reforms but for their sake. If the Russian president sees that deliberate sabotage is taking place and that there is no other way, I will be the first to approve of any decisive actions by Yeltsin to save Russia. The most terrible thing is that in many respects he is beginning to repeat Gorbachev's mistakes.

[Guk] Which ones, for example?

[Blagovolin] Well, he is appointing his plenipotentiaries in the provinces and they are not being allowed to work. Is this to be endured, as he is doing at present? Why is it possible to call publicly and with impunity for the overthrow of the legitimate power? I understand that everyone in power today wants to be a “pure democrat.”

But experience, political culture, and time are needed to create a working democratic model. We have none of this. Therefore I entreat Yeltsin to be a strong head of state. It is necessary to save the chief thing—Russia, its integrity, and our unique opportunity to become a part of the civilized community. Incidentally, people in the West also understand perfectly what will happen if democracy in Russia collapses and power passes to the hands of some dictator—it seems to me that there are quite a few candidates here.

General Medvedev Rules Out Nuclear Misuse
*AU2101132592 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
17 Jan 92 p 14*

[Interview with Major General Vladimir Medvedev, Commander in Chief of the National Center for Nuclear Risk Reduction of the former USSR, by Jan Zizka; place and date not given: "Nuclear Weapons Are Under Strict Control"]

[Text] The fate of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR is a subject of anxious discussion in the world. Major General Vladimir Medvedev, Commander in Chief of the National Center for Nuclear Risk Reduction at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the former USSR, answered several questions by our reporter about the nuclear arsenal in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

[Zizka] What are the duties of your center, and what does it deal with at present?

[Medvedev] The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers were created in Washington and Moscow on the basis of the Soviet-American treaty of 1987. Their main task is to exchange information on nuclear facilities. The centers inform each other 24 hours in advance when a rocket is launched. Our center takes part in organizing inspections. We cooperate with a corresponding agency in the United States. In the last three years, we have accepted 550 American inspection groups on our territory.

[Zizka] Who will participate in the talks on nuclear weapons in the United States in the future?

[Medvedev] This question is currently being discussed. The overall political line regarding nuclear weapons, including the future negotiations, is being discussed. I believe the CIS will find a convenient alternative and decide whom it will entrust with these negotiations. Now I am able to say that Russia—as the legal successor to the USSR, and therefore a party to international treaties signed by the former Soviet Union—will play a leading role. This does not exclude—on the contrary, it presumes—the participation of all other states in the negotiations, if they so wish.

[Zizka] Can Russia's exceptional position with regard to nuclear weapons give rise to pressure by this largest CIS state on other states?

[Medvedev] I do not think that such danger exists. The main part of the nuclear facilities is deployed in Russia. Russia is the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and it has never exerted pressure on other republics.

[Zizka] Beyond the CIS borders, tactical nuclear weapons raise more fears than the strategic nuclear weapons of the former USSR. Do you think that there is any possibility of their being sold to other countries, or even terrorist groups?

[Medvedev] I absolutely exclude any such possibility. In order to reduce anxiety regarding tactical weapons, the CIS states are taking steps to remove tactical weapons from the republics with the goal of liquidating them. You know, for example, that the Ukraine declared that all tactical weapons will be removed from its territory in the first half of 1992. The situation is similar in other states.

[Zizka] To what extent are tactical nuclear weapons under unified command?

[Medvedev] To the same extent as other nuclear weapons. That is, they are absolutely controlled.

[Zizka] Is the control over nuclear weapons really so strict that it is impossible to misuse them?

[Medvedev] Of course. All nuclear weapons are under strict control everywhere.

[Zizka] I would be interested in the fate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Has it been preserved in some form?

[Medvedev] There are still some armed forces whose fate is being discussed. For the time being, it is impossible to say what the main organs of the CIS and republican Armed Forces will look like. Today, we have a commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces. The apparatus that was formerly the Ministry of Defense remains in place. So does the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The control over army cannot be discontinued.

News Conference Discusses Uranium Sales Issue
*LD2001101592 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 0030 GMT 15 Jan 92*

[Excerpts] A news conference has been held at the Ministry of the Atomic Energy Industry on charges that the former USSR sold uranium at dumping prices. Correspondent Kirill Shakhnovich reports:

[Being Shakhnovich recording] [passage omitted] Those making the charges say that the production and enrichment of uranium in our country is based on principles of a non-market economy, which is quite logical. They say that this gives them the right, in accordance with a law regulating the procedure for setting prices, to bring a civil suit against us and to force us to pay a dumping levy.

The organizers of the news conference explained the unfairness of this American case. The reason for the pricing policy is that we have more up-to-date extraction and enrichment processes than the leading Western uranium suppliers. Our labor is cheaper and, as a result, the production cost of former Soviet uranium is lower than Western, although we sell it for the same price as our Western colleagues on the uranium market: \$22-23 per kilogram of unprocessed uranium. Moreover, our share of the world nuclear market is unfairly small at 36 percent, even though the territory of the former USSR accounts for 50 percent of world uranium reserves and processing capacities account for 20 to 25 percent of world capacities. If one adds to this the fact that our processing technologies are more advanced than many others, then we have the right to claim a share of the world nuclear market amounting not to 5 percent as now, but at least 25 percent.

These figures were sent to the relevant U.S. committee. How important is this trade to us? Let me cite some figures: Exports last year brought us \$500 million. This could reach \$1.5 billion per year. [passage omitted]

The states now part of the Commonwealth of Independent States are not ready to engage in the export of nuclear fuel. First, an International Atomic Energy agreement has to be signed. Second, despite everything, uranium reserves are distributed in the following way: 30 percent in Kazakhstan, 30 percent in Uzbekistan, 10 percent in Ukraine, and 30 percent in Russia. Only in Russia are there uranium enrichment and processing sectors. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Geneva Delegate Cited on Weapons' Elimination

*LD2001134192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1430 GMT 14 Jan 92*

[Text] In Geneva's Palais de Nations, where a session of the UN Disarmament Conference is under way, people are following with great anxiety the political squabbling within our Commonwealth over the command of the immense combat potential of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Our correspondent Farid Seyful-Mulyukov reports:

At issue are not only the strategic nuclear missiles, which will be under unified control, but also the tens of thousands of other weapons of mass destruction that have accumulated inside the collapsed Soviet empire, and the destiny of the thousands of first-class specialists in our military-industrial complex who, being threatened with unemployment, could become the quarry of adventurist regimes. Ultimately, how will the whole process of disarmament develop in these new conditions in the world? Who will implement the international agreements reached by Moscow on the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons, and how?

In the opinion of the representatives of many states at the Geneva disarmament talks, the agreements from Alma-Ata and Minsk do not provide clear answers to all these questions.

Sergey Batsanov, Russia's representative at the Geneva conference, said in conversation with your correspondent that if members of the Commonwealth are going to continue their lengthy disputes concerning division of the immense military legacy of the erstwhile Soviet Union, this will quite likely have a negative effect on the global disarmament process. My colleagues abroad, Batsanov continued, are constantly expressing this concern. First and foremost, of course, it is essential to determine within the framework of the Commonwealth a precise schedule and the conditions for implementation of the America-Soviet treaty on radical cuts in offensive nuclear weapons. However, neither must we lose sight of the other acute problems of disarmament, for example, the elimination of chemical weapons.

According to information quoted by Sergey Batsanov at a news conference in Geneva for foreign journalists, around 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons are concentrated on Russian territory. This is the gravest legacy left it by the Soviet military monster. How are these mountains of toxic materials to be destroyed safely? The erstwhile center did nothing to prepare for the elimination of the chemical weapons, Sergey Batsanov noted.

The UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the completion of the Geneva talks on chemical weapons this year. They are moving ahead successfully, the representative of Russia, the legal successor of the USSR at the Geneva conference, noted. Of course, the Russian leadership, Sergey Batsanov stressed, does have many other urgent domestic and international problems, but the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons cannot be cast aside or left in the pending tray. This affects the security of Russia and the whole Commonwealth, and security throughout the world.

Measures Outlined To Prevent Brain Drain

*OW2001155192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1345 GMT 20 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] What can prevent nuclear technology leaks from Russia through immigrant scientists is exchanges of information between countries and the setting up of an international fund to support fundamental sciences, said Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in answer to IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent's question about Western concern over the consequences of the possible brain drain from the former Soviet republics.

A. Kozyrev proceeds from the assumption that his country will not relapse into totalitarianism when people were forbidden to go abroad. The Russian foreign minister said that during his meeting with his German

counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher on January 15 he came out with two proposals to resolve this problem.

"It is necessary to enable the states to know who goes and where", said A. Kozyrev. "I also suggested that an international fund should be set up to support fundamental sciences thanks to which our nuclear physicists and other scientists would not be placed financially in a position compelling them to leave", said the head of Russian diplomacy.

"We should join our efforts in this area where there are broad opportunities for cooperation", he said.

Recruitment of Nuclear Scientists Seen an Issue

No Evidence of Brain Drain

PM1701160992 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2208 GMT 15 Jan 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast: Report by V. Glusker and N. Kepko]

[Text] The world is continuing to discuss the possibility of a nuclear threat from the territory of the former USSR. It is already clear to many today that it is not so much a question of controlling the nuclear button as of the danger that the process of the transfer of Soviet technology to dictatorial regimes could develop rapidly. In other words, a brain drain.

[Glusker] The West believes that there is a problem of the uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in a form not envisaged by any treaties—through the brain drain. This question is also being cautiously raised within the former Union, although it is instantly dropped again. For example, IZVESTIYA believes that no concrete, material evidence of a brain drain has been discovered here. However, what do people directly connected with this problem have to say? Here are some interviews outside the famous Lebedev Physics Institute, where Andrey Sakharov used to work.

[First unidentified man] We think that the bulk of really good scientists will leave as soon as they can.

[Second unidentified man] Scientific staffers are the real property of the Academy of Sciences—not tables, cupboards, chairs, or computers ultimately. The people who are being subjected to cuts are those who can do a good job, people with expertise, experience.

[Glusker] Young people are at a crossroads too, their future is uncertain.

[Third unidentified man] Time will tell. For the moment nothing is clear.

Likely Flight to Third World

PM2201092892 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report citing French newspaper LIBERATION: "A Bomb for al-Qadhdhafi?"]

[Text] The possible flight of Soviet nuclear scientists abroad represents a greater danger than the leak of radioactive substances from the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station—that is how the newspaper LIBERATION, which is close to the French Government, today comments on the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons arising from the breakup of the USSR.

Several thousand talented scientists and highly skilled technicians who possess what were formerly well-guarded secrets are now deprived of their former privileges. Soviet nuclear scientists have nothing left but their very valuable scientific baggage and applied knowledge. They could soon be using all this in the developing countries. Citing leaders of the Kurchatov Nuclear Research Institute, the newspaper points out that agents of the Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi have already invited two staffers of the institute to continue their research in Libya for \$2,000 a month. Fortunately the scientists turned down this proposal.

But the risk of Soviet nuclear scientists turning up in "Third World" countries is very real, in the view of Francois Heisbourg, director of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies. In an interview for LIBERATION he proposed that highly trusted specialists be used in the elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons, to prevent the spread of nuclear technology.

Proliferation Threat Assessed

PM2101151392 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Jan 92 p 4

[“My Opinion” commentary by Anatoliy Karpychev, incorporating interviews with V.N. Mikhaylov, deputy minister of the former USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry, and A.Yu. Gagarinskiy, executive secretary of the Soviet Nuclear Society; place and date not given: “Will We Save Our Nuclear Specialists’ Souls?”—last two paragraphs are accompanying TASS report]

[Text] After the military, it is evidently the turn of nuclear scientists and all those employed in nuclear weapons production to go through “hell”—the breakup of the USSR.

On the one hand, Western politicians and military officers suspect that, given the chaos in the former Soviet Union, those people can find work in so-called Third World countries and help “ambitious governments” develop an atomic bomb. On the other, our new governments have reduced scientists to such a pitiful state that tomorrow they will be forced to choose between poverty at home and recognition abroad and will therefore agree to any offer worthy of their honor and knowledge.

We cannot hide from this problem as we hid for many years the names of talented scientists in possession of secrets. It would be as well for the Russian president and the governments of the Commonwealth's independent states to examine this problem since it has made its presence felt so loudly...That is not merely my wish...Because while we retain our Olympian calm, rumors are growing about the buying and selling of our nuclear scientists, forming the plot of a whodunnit.

Well, Libya, for instance, has supposedly tried to recruit a couple of personnel from the well-known Kurchatov Institute, but these people took the offer of wages of \$2,000 per month and turned it down (and they were right to do so; it's a pittance). Then a report appeared that plutonium bearing the USSR's mark had been seized in Italy and that this was the raw material for a nuclear weapon. Indian newspapers in turn reported that the United States would stop five of our specialists going to India because they know strategic secrets.

Naturally, the Western special services have begun to be concerned. The CIA drafted a report for legislators voicing alarm at the "nuclear brain drain" from the USSR. It is being said that a department has even been created in the CIA to keep an eye on our nuclear specialists' travels and movements. The problem has become so hot that Western leaders intend to broach the new "Soviet threat" during their talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin when he visits Washington in late January.

What has caused this problem?

In principle the problem has always existed, but it came to light following the breakup of the USSR insofar as nuclear scientists may be left without a job. There has always been interest in their work—and moreover not only from Iran, or Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and those countries that are now said to be persistently seeking contacts with our scientists and offering them the "sweet life" in exchange for an atomic bomb. Talented scientists have always gone abroad. The policy of "hang onto them and do not let them go" is long out of date. According to preliminary studies carried out in the United States, up to 50,000 U.S. employers, various firms, companies, laboratories, and universities among them, may be interested in qualified scientific cadres from the USSR—physicists, chemists, mathematicians, etc. Talented Russians are being sought out. The name of a company, Kaiser Research, recently caught my eye. It monitors the successful contenders and winners of virtually every scientific competition held in various countries of the world and with its help many firms acquire skills, including from the USSR. Today you can find our specialists in Cambridge lecture halls and Silicon Valley's computer laboratories. Five out of six professorial posts at Minnesota's Institute of Theoretical Physics, which is jokingly called "Moscow on Mississippi," are held by natives of Russia. Many of our scientists are working on contract.

All this is a mute reproach to us as we lose our talented specialists. The Americans willingly agree to take clever people (fools are of no interest to them) since they effectively get a ready-made specialist and do not have to spend money on training. The specialist is, as it were, born there "ready-made," while we have spent the money. A new subdivision even appeared quite recently within the U.S. Administration—a committee on problems involved in utilizing Soviet scientists. We should have a committee in the Russian Administration for problems involved in utilizing talented scientists...so as to really support them at a difficult time. After all, the heroes' stars with which the state honors their work are worthless now. So, when I hear that a scientist is leaving, I say: "Very well, let him go, he'll meet up with his colleagues." You must not think that he is not a patriot.

CIA documents quote a statement by V.N. Mikhaylov, former USSR deputy minister of atomic power engineering and industry. Here it is: "I can say with complete certainty that my colleagues are patriots and have no intention of going abroad to develop nuclear weapons for anyone...But, on the other hand, how is a man who has worked in a ministry that developed nuclear weapons to live on wages of 400 rubles (roughly \$9) per month...What can a man do who has only known how to develop atomic bombs?"

After "congratulating" Viktor Nikitovich Mikhaylov on being quoted by the CIA, I asked his opinion about the problem of the "nuclear brain drain" and control over nuclear weapons proliferation here at home.

[Mikhaylov] Well, I didn't convert the wages into dollars, they did this at their own discretion. People are not fleeing the nuclear weapons complex. There are, needless to say, unscrupulous people who may want to make something out of our difficulties, but they are not scientists.

[Karpychev] Won't your sector collapse with the breakup of the USSR? As I see it, that must not be allowed, since the consequences are unpredictable....

[Mikhaylov] I think that the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry should be preserved as a Russian ministry. Approximately 80 percent of its enterprises are in Russia. There must be state, centralized control so as to prevent the buying and selling of secrets and prevent the proliferation of nuclear technologies. This is not an area in which the state should relax its control. As for the Commonwealth states, we could act with them on the basis of agreements. That's logical since we must maintain the standard of our technologies together.

[Karpychev] What comment would you pass on the report from Italy that our plutonium was being sold there?

[Mikhaylov] I don't know about any sale. We keep account down to fractions of a milligram...I am talking about the plutonium required to develop nuclear weapons. We are setting up concerns within the ministry

framework in some areas that service the main tasks; but that has nothing to do with plutonium [Po otdelnym napravleniyam, obsluzhivayushchim glavnyye zadachi, u nas sozdayutsya kontserny v ramkakh ministerstva; no k plutoniyu eto otnosheniya ne imeyet]. [Mikhaylov ends]

I had another conversation about the problem with Dr. of Mathematicophysical Sciences Andrey Yuryevich Gagarinskiy, executive secretary of the Soviet Nuclear Society.

[Karpichev] Is it true that the Libyans have recruited scientists from the Kurchatov Institute?

[Gagarinskiy] No, it's not...As the institute's deputy director I can say that with certainty. I can also say that during the late seventies a nuclear research center was built in Libya with our help. It tackles peaceful problems. Our scientists go there regularly.

[Karpichev] Do you think that our scientists, if they go abroad, can be of considerable help to interested states in developing an atomic bomb?

[Gagarinskiy] Our people are attracted to working abroad. We are not only cooperating with Libya. Scientists go to Western countries, they are interested in one another. But I think the situation in our science is now critical. Production is more or less socially protected. Science is not. Science is encountering tremendous difficulties. Right now it has to have very strong nerves....[Gagarinskiy ends]

In my view, there is a reason for everything...This hullabaloo included. I believe that the aim is, first, to create the impression of even greater instability in the former Soviet Union. Second, to prepare our public for various surprises, particularly when it comes to allocating money for military requirements. This is an old approach, but no other has as yet been devised. And, third, given the instability in our country, why not try to lay a hand—either in the form of international supervision or concern for our scientists—on the assets we possess in the nuclear sphere?

Be that as it may, the upsurge of emotion over our scientists, with the claim that they are willing to serve whoever you like wherever you like, and sell off the fatherland's property, is immoral.

STOP PRESS...

San Francisco, 20 Jan— THE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER reported that a conference entitled "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the End of the Soviet Empire" at the Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory in Livermore (California) was devoted to the problem of the "brain drain" from the former Soviet Union and the resulting increased danger of nuclear weapons proliferation in Third World countries.

Various courses of action in the prevailing situation were considered. One being to organize financial aid and

formulate programs to support the conversion of the former Soviet Union's military industry. It was said that U.S. aid to Commonwealth of Independent States countries should depend on the extent to which they can "control their scientists possessing experience of nuclear developments." The conference voiced the idea of introducing tough controls on exports of technology and equipment to Third World countries that could be used to develop or test an atomic bomb.

Belarus Nuclear Weapons Moved to Russia

LD2601113292 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1049 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Report by BELTA correspondents Vladimir Glod and Aleksandr Kryzhanovskiy]

[Text] Minsk, 26 Jan (TASS)—The first batch of tactical nuclear weapons have already been transported from Belarus to the territory of the Russian Federation, where in accordance with an accord they will be destroyed.

This was stated today by Leonid Privalov, deputy chairman of the commission for matters of national security of the Belorussian parliament. Speaking at a "round table" for journalists covering the visit of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, he confirmed the republic's commitment to becoming a non-nuclear, neutral state in the near future. "Belarus will be free of strategic nuclear weapons in approximately 1996 or 1997," Leonid Privalov said. After this, only the armed forces of the republic of Belarus will remain on its territory. The deputy chairman of the parliamentary commission did not give their projected number. "Today, Belarus cannot see an enemy who it is necessary to go to war against, either on its borders or further afield," he stressed.

Estonia To Sign Nonproliferation Treaty

924P0053A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 5

[Article: "Baltics: They Intend to Become Nuclear-Free"]

[Text] Estonia is prepared to sign the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty. It also hopes that the three Baltic states will sign an agreement on their nondeployment in their territories. This was announced by Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Meri in an interview with the Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT. He reported that according to information of the government there are two secret nuclear reactors in the republic's territory at the military base in Paldiski 40 km from Tallinn. In his opinion, this represents a significant threat not only to Estonia but also to the countries of the European north and Germany. The minister indicated that the Commonwealth of Independent States must promptly remove tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of the Baltic states under international verification.

Kazakhstan Link With PLO Outlined

*92US0183A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 p 3*

[“Authoritative Opinion” article by V. Isayev, department chief at the Oriental Studies Institute: “Hands Extended to the Nuclear Button”]

[Text] At the end of last December in different corners of the world two events occurred which are externally unrelated to one another in any way: PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat made a brief visit to the capital of Kazakhstan and Islamic Fundamentalists won a convincing victory in the first round of elections in Algeria.

It is known that Algeria has been working on developing its own nuclear program for a fairly long time and without much success. In its implementation it relies on an agreement concluded with China in 1972. Let us recall, incidentally, that China has not yet signed the Agreement for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to certain information, the Algerians are also exchanging nuclear information with Iraq. The UN experts who inspected the Iraqi nuclear installations after Iraq's failed aggression against Kuwait stated that some of the uranium accumulated by Iraq which was suitable for producing an atomic bomb had disappeared. After a certain amount of time this uranium floated to the surface... in Algeria. In the Western press there was an announcement that a group of Iraqi nuclear physicists had also ended up in Algeria. It is possible that this information should be regarded as normal cooperation between the two countries in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy engineering. But at least two considerations put us on guard: the character of the Iraqi regime, which is now known throughout the world, and the victory of Muslim fundamentalists in the elections in Algeria.

The fact that the PLO has extremely “warm” relations with Saddam Husayn’s regime is generally known. But one should not forget that it also has these ties with Algeria, whose leaders have been captivated by the moods of the “Arab street,” which since the autumn of 1990 has been exulting in an attack of “Saddamomania.” And the PLO has never forgotten that Algeria is one of the economically and militarily most powerful Arab countries, which also has two operational nuclear reactors. There is evidence that another reactor is in the stage of construction. Contacts with Algeria became especially important to the PLO leaders after they ended up in deep political isolation after the failure of the Iraqi adventure.

Under these conditions 'Arafat on his flight from China stops off in Kazakhstan. The questions arise quite naturally: Why Kazakhstan in particular and not, say, Uzbekistan? Is it not because Kazakhstan has now become one of the owners of part of the nuclear “legacy” of the former USSR? It would be interesting to know how the “equivocal” figure of 'Arafat appeared in Alma-Ata. Who sent the invitation? Or did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan decide

to begin to establish diplomatic relations not with sovereign states but with the PLO? It would be interesting to know Alma-Ata’s answers to these questions.

Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev on SS-19 Missile Launch

*LD2101225392 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2035 GMT 21 Jan 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Excerpt] Alma-Ata, 21 Jan (TASS)—The Kazakhstan president’s press service distributed a statement here today in connection with the report published in *IZVESTIYA* about the alleged launching from the territory of the republic of an SS-19 ballistic missile.

“On 20 December 1991 at Baykonur cosmodrome,” it says, “a Rokot space rocket was launched. This was undertaken for scientific purposes under the conversion program. Consequently, reports about the testing of a ballistic missile for military purposes is not in accord with reality.

“Because no mutually acceptable approaches have been worked out among the Commonwealth of Independent States members regarding the Armed Forces, including the use of the space testing facility, and because on 20 December 1991 no final decision yet existed on forming the Commonwealth, it is unnecessary to dramatize each instance of test launches of space technology,” the statement stresses. “At the same time, Kazakhstan is aware that questions of the control of the former USSR’s nuclear potential have indeed come to a head. However, they should be resolved without confrontation with the space and defense departments in a process of negotiations and of adopting mutually acceptable agreements.

“The position of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev on military questions and the use of space technology is well known. It is this: preservation of the joint Armed Forces, control of nuclear weapons from a single center, dual subordination of general purpose forces, use of the Baykonur cosmodrome and the Kurchatov scientific center for the common benefit of all states of the Commonwealth. All of these questions must be resolved stage by stage and without haste in order to prevent chaos and disorder in the process [words indistinct]”. [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan Legislator on Nuclear Arms

*PM2201155992 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jan 92 First Edition p 2*

[Correspondent Sergey Skorokhodov report: “We Gave the President Free Rein”]

[Excerpts] Alma-Ata—The view of power expressed by S. Abdildin, chairman of the Republic of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, at a news conference on the results of

the seventh session of parliament can be expressed in precisely those terms—"free rein." [passage omitted]

Answering questions from participants in the news conference, Abdildin stated that Kazakhstan is not going to sell nuclear weapons to anyone either now or in the future, no matter how favorable such offers may appear. He also confirmed the intention to examine President N. Nazarbayev's proposal on introducing a six-day working week at industrial and some other enterprises. [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan Denies Nuclear Arms Trade With Iran

LD2801195392 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT
28 Jan 92

[By KAZTAG correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[Text] Alma-Ata January 28 TASS—The Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry has issued a statement denying foreign media reports that the republic ostensibly engages in trade in nuclear weapons.

As an example, the ministry cites the British newspaper the DAILY MAIL which reported at the end of last week Iran's attempts to acquire intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles from Kazakhstan.

The British newspaper wrote that Iran acquired such an opportunity in view of the gaining of state independence by Kazakhstan.

The DAILY MAIL asserted that President Nursultan Nazarbayev had ostensibly made at least two unreported visits to Tehran to discuss the terms of a deal to this effect.

"Such allegations" in all obviousness point to their organised nature, the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry stated. The entire logic of events indicates that certain circles pursue the aim of detracting from Kazakhstan's international prestige on the eve of its admission to the United Nations organisation.

The Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry firmly condemns the circulation of false information about its alleged trade in nuclear weapons with anyone whatsoever or about its president's secret trips to Tehran.

The statement recalls that during recent meetings with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, Nazarbayev had again reaffirmed the well-known stand concerning Kazakhstan's participation in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation processes.

Through such provocations, no one is allowed to impair mutual understanding which is taking shape with such a difficulty as regards a solution to one of major issues of

our times and Kazakhstan's aspiration to strengthen international stability, the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry statement points out.

Lithuanian President Views Nuclear Arms

LD2401143992 London ITV Television Network
in English 1900 GMT 23 Jan 92

[“Channel 4 News” interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by correspondent Jon Snow in London on 23 January—recorded]

[Text] [Snow] Earlier, I spoke to the president of the Baltic state of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis. He was on a visit to London. I asked him if he thinks the West is doing enough to tackle the current crisis.

[Landsbergis] They are now hard times—in Russia especially. The rest of the countries must help extremely. But, it is also a good occasion to resolve the problem of dissolution of nuclear weapons. So, if these two issues could be connected and resolved effectively, it would be a greatest achievement.

[Snow] Should it be quite so crude? I mean, this amount of aide for X amount of weapons?

[Landsbergis] Of course. But, not only the destruction of these, but also their facilities and the centers. Because, you know it is a danger that they can be bought by other interested countries.

[Snow] But do you think this is realistic? Do you think this is a formula, an equation, that could actually work? Do you think anybody in Russia is really prepared to look at it that way?

[Landsbergis] I can say isn't realistic. [sentence as heard] But, it is possible to see it as a goal, as a main goal. A goal of main importance for Europe and all the world.

[Snow] How extreme are you prepared to be? I mean, no aid? Or, basic aid and then once developmental aid is discussed, then the nuclear issue has to be addressed?

[Landsbergis] People in Russia and peoples of other former Soviet republics need assistance and extreme aid now. My opinion, Western countries must go with this aid, but at the same time very concrete discussion about liquidation of nuclear weapons must be raised.

[Snow] How does the West's response to the aid crisis in the former Soviet Union impinge on Lithuania specifically?

[Landsbergis] At first, this aid, which Russia needs now, is very important to keep for them the way for democracy. We belong, also, on this. Because, the most dangerous event, for us, it would be the coup, revolution, or new totalitarianism in Russia. But also, we would like very much to see small part of this aid would be given for housing for Soviet officers—to be a removal of Soviet Army, from the Soviet Army from Lithuania's soil to be realized in short time.

Article Rebuts Uranium Sales 'Canard'

*92US0188A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 3*

[Article by Oleg Panfilov: "Tajikistan as a Nuclear Power? This Is a Deliberate 'Canard'—Such Is the Opinion of the Head of the Muslims of the Republic"]

[Text] In the last days of 1991, the republic NARODNAYA GAZETA (formerly KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA) published an article entitled "Tajik Uranium for the Islamic Bomb?" The item was prepared by the new independent agency "News of Tajikistan" (NANT) which made its presence known several months ago.

A narration about the operation of the mining and chemical combine in the north of Tajikistan, which has not been considered secret for a long time now, constitutes the bulk of the content of this article.

In the 1940's, when the USSR was developing its own nuclear weapons, Combine No. 6 reporting to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building was founded next to Leninabad. Initially the combine processed local raw materials mined in the western spurs of Tyan-Shan, as well as ore shipped in after primary processing. However, the article maintains that a uranium enrichment facility hidden deep in the underground is capable of turning out products directly suitable for manufacturing nuclear warheads. Moreover, the author of the item said that the government is interested in selling enriched uranium, as well as in setting up a consortium with Arab countries in order to develop uranium deposits.

Referring to the fact that Tajikistan is not bound by international obligations on control over nuclear production facilities, the article made a supposition regarding extensive sales of Tajik uranium to Middle East countries. A specific address was named—Libya. A congratulatory message to the Tajikistan President Rakhman Nabiyev from the Libyan leader, Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, is cited as "proof."

The article was noticed by foreign information agencies and produced the expected effect. However, it is surprising that the leadership of the republic still has not responded to the article. As the leaders of the opposition believe, the appearance of the article was precisely "timed" to coincide with an official visit to Tajikistan by a Libyan delegation headed by a representative of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Sharif, general secretary of the "Islamic Appeal" society and considered to be the main ideologist of the Jamahiriya and the number three person in Libya next to al-Qadhafi. The society he heads has its branches and Islamic cultural centers in 56 countries, as well as educational establishments at which, incidentally, two students from Tajikistan are already studying. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Tajikistan has been cooperating with this society for a long time. During the visit, a new agreement was signed concerning the restoration

and construction of 35 mosques in the republic and the admission of another three Tajik students to an Islamic institute.

However, despite its governmental status, the Libyan delegation visiting Tajikistan was not received by the president of the republic. As we have learned from unofficial sources, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakim Kayumov was instrumental in this. A communique which presupposes cooperation in the future became the only document signed during the visit. However, by all signs, the government of Tajikistan did not respond to the call to establish diplomatic relations.

The visit of the Libyan delegation lasted for less than a full day, and there were no official reports in the press on this account. However, Judge Khodzha Akbar Turadzhonzoda, head of the Spiritual Administration of the republic, who agreed to comment on the item in NARODNAYA GAZETA, believes that the publication of the article on uranium production in Tajikistan was deliberate.

"This 'canard' was arranged by the enemies of the Tajik people, who, as fate would have it, live in a region where an intense struggle for influence is under way. There is no need to conceal that a certain hostility toward the Muslim peoples exists, which is fueled by the mass media of the former Union and Western Europe. The sponsors of this article decided to sustain the hullabaloo. Apparently, being aware of the arrival of the Libyan delegation, they resolved at one point to instill anti-Libyan spirit among the population of Tajikistan and other Central Asian republics. The main objective was to prevent the recognition of new Central Asian states as democratic states, although I do believe the republics of Central Asia are indeed far from democracy. The latest presidential election in Tajikistan bears testimony to that. There are defense enterprises in the territory of our republic, but the body of deputies knows nothing about them. I hope that in the immediate future, the Council of Ministers will inform the deputies whether components for the production of nuclear weapons are manufactured in our republic."

"If so, do you think these enterprises should be closed down?"

"By no means. We should publicly announce that they exist, impose strict international controls, and trade legally with civilized countries with a view to using our raw materials for peaceful purposes. This is a source of hard currency for our republic, and this should not be concealed."

Tajik Role in 'Islamic Bomb' Debunked

*924P0053C Moscow ZHIZN in Russian
No 1 Jan 92 p 5*

[“Sensation” Article by Otakhon Latifi: “Tajik Uranium for the Islamic Bomb?”]

[Text] This was the title of a pre-New Year's article in NARODNAYA GAZETA—in the recent past KOM-MUNIST TAJIKISTANA, press organ of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee. Despite the question mark in the headline and the reference of the author of the note V. Alekseyeva to such a source of information as the NANT (National News Agency of Tajikistan), the report stirred up the public.

I will present the basic points of the sensational information:

"This took place in the 1940's, when on the orders of I.O. Stalin the course was taken to build a domestic atomic bomb as soon as possible. The specialists made their choice at the uranium deposit in northern Tajikistan. Here a top-secret plant was built in a very short time.... So it remains to this day....

"At the present time, in accordance with the "Act on the Independence of the Republic of Tajikistan," this plant is becoming the property of the republic. And immediately, seemingly having forgotten about the top-secrecy, in the lobbies of power they began to talk about the dividends that nuclear technology can give to the republic.

"The Islamic world, which has long been dreaming of possessing its own nuclear arsenal, may, after the defeat of Saddam Husayn, obtain in the person of Rakhman Nabiyev the leader who is capable of helping them to satisfy their own ambitions. The president of the Republic of Tajikistan, having the reputation of being a resolute and harsh leader, is, judging by all appearances, evoking more and more sympathy among the leaders of the eastern states. It is symptomatic that the Libyan leader M. al-Qadhdhafi was one of the first to congratulate the president of the Republic of Tajikistan upon his election.

"It is possible that its uranium reserves and ready production systems for its enrichment will help Tajikistan to obtain maximum benefits for itself, especially since new and even more significant deposits of this strategic raw material were recently discovered in the republic.

"But one can only guess how events will continue to develop in the explosive region of south Asia."

That was the information. It was thought that the authorities would make some sort of statement about this. But they are maintaining silence and thereby giving rise to idle talk, conjecture, and rumors. The new leaders essentially have nothing to do with the press. Furthermore, they avoid meetings. My colleague, IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Karpov, wanted to interview the President of the Republic Rakhman Nabiyev. But he just could not reach him. I decided to help Aleksandr and called Karim Abdulov, head of the president's secretariat. This is the reason that he gave for R. Nabiyev's not wanting to meet with the journalist:

"We do not like some correspondents of the central newspapers. There is an instruction to talk with their leaders and to have these journalists replaced by our people."

[That is] openness in the spirit of the stagnant-administrative times, when high-ranking party bureaucrats sent notes or messengers to secretaries and members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to replace independent journalists that have their own opinion with those who are obedient, "in their pocket," and to deceive public opinion through central publications. But I know from my own experience that even then not every chief editor went along with the powers that be. All the more so now, for the former central newspapers have become independent. Their correspondents in the former fraternal republics represent publications of independent states in another independent state. International law extends to their correspondents and it is inviolable. And the editor's office alone decides who will work where. Of course the Republic of Tajikstan may, with good reason, refuse to accredit them. But apparently K. Abdulov and those like him do not understand that the world community, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, judges the authorities by their attitude toward journalists (their own and those from abroad).

Yes, obedient journalists can write different things, having much more information than the former infamous KGB and, like it, they can start rumors, sometimes on someone else's orders. In any event, however, a press statement requires an immediate reaction. Otherwise a lie may pass for the truth. This is what is happening with the Islamic atomic bomb filled with Tajik uranium. It is possible that there was such irresponsible talk in the corridors of power. I do not know. I do not know.

Not waiting for denials, I turned to G. Koshlakov, chairman of the State Committee for Economics and a person who is most knowledgeable in such questions, for an explanation. He was trained as a geologist, worked for a long time in different geological groups and expeditions, was head of the republic directorate for geology, and was first deputy chairman of the Tajik Council of Ministers. In short, he knows almost everything about Tajik uranium.

"Everything in the article is pure invention with the exception of the fact of the raw material for the first Soviet atomic bomb, and even that is not completely accurate," says Georgiy Vadimovich. "It is true that in the 1940's the deposit was worked and metallic uranium was extracted from the ore. This uranium went through other technological chains to become a component for nuclear reactors and weapons. The mining and initial processing was done here and the rest far from us in several cities. The deposit has long since been depleted. Others have not been found. I can tell you this very authoritatively. And the mining and metallurgical combine, now the concern "Vostokredmet," is undergoing conversion. The collective deals with the extraction of

rare metals—important admixtures for high-quality steels. After mastering the production of buses, it is adding mining equipment."

I can add something for my part. In my youth with Vitaliy Ignatenko, the current general director of TASS, we found out that the Tajik uranium deposit was closed and we went to the B.D. Pankin, chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. He signed a letter to Petrosyanets, head of Glavatom, saying that we want to give a series of essays from Atomabad, as the city of Chkalovsk near Leninabad, today's Khudzhandom, was called in foreign sources. We soon received an answer—wait five years. That turned out to be the period for the declassification of the installations where the work was stopped.

There were always many legends about Chkalovsk and this is so even now, again because of a lack of reliable information. One thing is known for sure: metallic uranium is produced here now but from imported ore.

Fersman called Tajikistan a unique natural laboratory. Almost all climatic zones are represented here. Even today, every year biologists and zoologists discover new species of flora and fauna. The republic is also rich in mineral resources. They recently declassified the richest silver deposit in the world—Kanimansur. Dozens of foreign firms are offering their services in its development. But for the time being, the legal norms are being studied. One cannot go to the market without knowing the rules. Even if they do not rob you, they will put conditions on you that will keep you subjected for a lifetime.

Tajikistan Denies Sale of Uranium Abroad

*OW2501173292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1356 GMT 25 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Tajikistan's Foreign Minister Lakim Kayumov has denied that any member of the republican government ever negotiated the sale of uranium ore or its derivatives with foreign representatives.

In an interview with IF [INTERFAX], he expressed surprise at the refusal of most countries worldwide to recognize Tajik independence—allegedly because of the republic's sale of uranium abroad. The minister stressed that the Tajik parliament's appeal to the world community following the proclamation of Tajikistan's independence reiterated the republic's adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

U.S. Concern Over Arms Exports Noted

*924P0053D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 2*

[“Politics” Article by Andrey Zagorskiy: “Americans Playing Out the Versions of a Nuclear Conflict in the

Former USSR: the Disintegration of the Union Threatens to Escalate the Nuclear Menace to the Entire World”]

[Text] “Early on the morning of 10 September, Ukrainian armed formations moved out to capture intercontinental ballistic missiles in the region of Deryazhnaya and Pervomaysk as well as the remaining depots of tactical nuclear weapons in the republic. Heavy battles ensued in all of these places defended by Russified Armed Forces (CIS). Half of the nuclear depots quickly went over to the side of the superior Ukrainian forces but significant numbers of well-armed Russian troops fiercely defended the deployment sites of the ICBM's....

“At midday on 11 September, analogous actions were undertaken to capture ICBM's in Kazakhstan and Belarus....

“At 2330 on 12 September, a single nuclear warhead was exploded at an altitude of 300 km above the surface of the earth about 30 km to the south of Kiev. The blast was visible throughout the territory of Europe and a significant part of the Middle East.”

No, these are not lines from a new novel by Aleksandr Kabakov. And, praise God, they did not come off the teletype. The excerpts were taken from a scenario for a strategic game worked out by the American Rand Corporation—one of the brain trusts close to the republican administration of the United States. The objective of the strategic game is absolutely serious. The Americans are so concerned about the pilferage of the nuclear weapons in the remains of the former USSR that they consider it necessary to “play out” the worst versions of the development of events.

They are worried not only by the prospect of the division of the nuclear legacy of the USSR but also by the danger of the new sovereign states becoming the source of deliveries of nuclear and other technologies to countries, among others, that can use them to develop up-to-date arms.

The experts were enormously concerned about reports that commercial structures close to the former Ministry of Atomic Energy are making a claim on services to destroy toxic wastes through underground nuclear blasts and are also prepared to sell nuclear reactors and enriched uranium. This kind of information was perceived as a grave warning that a military-industrial complex of the USSR deprived of state orders may seek a way out through the sale of its own technology for foreign exchange, destroying the already fragile balance in the world.

It is possible that our former adversaries and partners of today are exaggerating to some extent. Fear has big eyes. Unfortunately, however, so little attention is being paid to the questions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies in our everyday policy that even decisions dictated by good intentions sometimes only add fuel to the fire and worsen the fears.

Such a situation has come about quite recently. In resolving the question of the dissolution or curtailment of former alliance structures, scarcely anyone was concerned about the fate of the service for monitoring the export of output and technologies used in the production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological) and other contemporary arms (ballistic missiles, for example).

That same service monitored and tracked the observance of nonproliferation in the country.

At the present time, the export control service does not have information about who is selling what to whom. Nor is there any confidence that this service can survive the transitional period and be restored in the structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Joint control of exports in the territory of the Commonwealth is essential. The materials for a nuclear bomb can certainly be gathered under the principle of "a little bit from everyone." The example of Husayn is quite convincing in this respect.

Ukraine Will Become Nuclear Free

Kravchuk on Nuclear Arms

*LD2401182892 Moscow TASS in English
1545 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev January 24 TASS—Ukraine will become a nuclear-free state. All tactical nuclear arms will be withdrawn from its territory by July 1, 1992 and all strategic warheads will be eliminated by 1994, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told visiting French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas on Friday [24 January]. 35 per cent of tactical nuclear weapons had already been withdrawn from Ukraine, Kravchuk said, adding he is satisfied "with the Russian help in the process".

Kravchuk disclosed that he and the leaders of all the other Commonwealth nuclear powers have a special telephone line by means of which the use of nuclear arms from the territories of these countries can be initiated or blocked. "I hope the day (to use the line) will not come", Kravchuk said.

The president informed that the final strength of the Ukrainian Army has been decided on. It will number 220 thousand people.

Kravchuk said the 1954 decision to hand over the Crimea to Ukraine was adopted according to the constitutional norms. The decision was taken by the Supreme Soviets of both Russia and Ukraine and was later

approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Besides, the majority of the Crimean population voted for the peninsula to remain Ukrainian at a referendum held on December 1, 1991, Kravchuk added.

Dumas noted Ukraine has strong legal arguments in the dispute.

The Russian parliament authorised some of its commissions on Thursday to assess whether the 1954 decision on the Crimean handover corresponded to the Constitution.

Dumas News Conference

*OW2401223292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1849 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] The French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas has said that in the course of his talks with the Ukrainian leaders he could see for himself their determination to make their country nuclear-free. The French Foreign Minister told a news conference in Kiev on Friday [24 January] Ukraine informed him it that 35% of tactical nuclear arms had already been withdrawn from its territory.

At the same news conference, in which the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko took part, it was announced that Ukraine and France had signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations, as well as a number of agreements on consultations between their foreign ministries and on consular relations.

Asked about Kiev's response to the Russian parliament's resolutions concerning the Black Sea Fleet and the problem of the Crimea, Zlenko said that "Ukraine rejects any territorial claims".

The Ukrainian Foreign Minister argues that the people of the Crimea decided their future in the referendum of December 1 1991, when they voted for remaining in Ukraine. Zlenko made it clear that Kiev would soon make appropriate decisions to "rule out any such statements and resolutions in the future." [passage omitted]

Ukraine, Belarus To Lose Tactical Nuclear Arms

*LD2401173492 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1526 GMT 24 Jan 92*

[From the "Military News" section: "In Early February All Tactical Nuclear Weapons Will Be Withdrawn From the Territory of Ukraine and Belarus"—POSTFACTUM headline]

[Text] According to confidential sources, in early February all tactical nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine and Belarus. Strategic weapons (mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles) are expected to leave Belarus by 1995.

Ukraine Wants Nuclear-Free Area by 2000

*LD1701185692 Moscow TASS in English 1248 GMT
17 Jan 92*

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Golyayev]

[Text] Rome, January 17 (TASS)—Ukraine plans to get rid of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory by the year 2000, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said.

In an interview with the Italian magazine EPOCA, Kravchuk said Ukraine is ready to sign an agreement on

the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and will call for the elimination of all nuclear warheads on its territory.

"The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union envisages the elimination of 130 nuclear warheads in Ukraine. But we have counted 176 of them," Kravchuk said.

"We want to include another 46 warheads into the agreement and hope to get rid of the most part our nuclear weapons by 2000. I said the most part because technical problems remain. There is only one specialised centre to destroy nuclear missiles in the former Soviet Union, in the Urals," the Ukrainian leader said.

FRANCE

Adherence to Non-Proliferation Pact Announced

LD2701183692 Paris France-Inter Radio Network
in French 1800 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] By a decision of the government, France has officially announced its adherence to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

GERMANY

Genscher 'Worried' About Nuclear Proliferation

AU2301103292 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 23 Jan 92 p 6

[“kk.” report: “Genscher Wants To Step Up Controls”]

[Text] Washington—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his U.S. counterpart, James Baker, are worried about the mounting danger caused by the proliferation of nuclear technology that can be used for military purposes. In Washington Genscher said that what he and Baker particularly fear is that experts and technology of the former Soviet Union might drain off to states that are trying “to get hold of the (nuclear) bomb.” To prevent such proliferation of nuclear arms, Genscher suggested that steps be taken in three areas.

On the one hand, one should examine the setting up of an international foundation to take care of those nuclear scientists who are losing their jobs as a result of the developments in the CIS republics. These people must not be left to “lurers and shanghaiers.” Second, countries that are potential exporters of nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons technology should threaten with severe punishment those citizens who cooperate in projects designed to produce arms of mass destruction. In this connection Genscher made reference to the relevant German laws. Finally, the members of the UN Security Council should work toward the international “isolation” of those states that are trying to acquire nuclear arms.

Genscher noted that for these efforts it is important that nuclear states, such as the United States, and nonnuclear states, such as Germany, cooperate closely. As long as the nuclear powers fight alone against proliferation, the danger remains of their being accused of trying to prevent nuclear proliferation out of their own interests in power. In addition, Baker and Genscher advocated the quick implementation of the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, a step that was announced by President Bush and former Soviet President Gorbachev.

Intelligence Services Warn of Nuclear ‘Blackmail’

AU2801145792 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
27 Jan 92 pp 18-20

[Unattributed report: “Fear of Nuclear Blackmail”]

[Excerpt] The disintegration of the Soviet Union and concerns about possible consequences have alerted the intelligence services. Power-thirsty rulers might lure unemployed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons experts from the former superpower and use their know-how to blackmail the world. Kohl and Genscher are trying to find a solution—through the United Nations?

During a confidential meeting between Helmut Kohl and U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in the Chancellor’s Office in mid-January, nothing was left of the triumph over the collapse of socialism and the victory of democracy. The two politicians were scared.

Kohl and Cheney agreed that the free world is facing a “huge danger.” From the former Soviet Union, now in chaos, the know-how and material on the production and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems could get into the hands of states like Iran, Iraq, or Libya.

What is more, the West must consider the possibility of gigantic blackmail. The risks would be incalculable if nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical weapons were to get into the hands of terrorists.

Kohl stressed repeatedly that the possibility must be prevented at all costs that thousands of top scientists of the former Soviet arms industry with their comprehensive know-how, who are now unemployed, are hired away by Third World states that are intent on having nuclear weapons. Something is brewing here, Kohl said, that is much more dangerous than the strategic nuclear weapons in some successor states of the Soviet empire.

Kohl was worried by reports of his own intelligence service that a remarkable number of delegations from Islamic states have traveled to neighboring republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. The Iranian foreign minister also went to Kazakhstan to hire arms scientists, the Intelligence Service [BND] speculates.

BND headquarters in Pullach warned the Chancellor’s Office: “With the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and now Yugoslavia, and personnel cuts in the Western countries’ arms factories, the number of available experts has considerably increased. It must be expected that financially strong countries will use their know-how.”

In addition, the number of countries procuring nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is continuously increasing, the BND warns. The threat will even increase in the next eight years; then “about 15 countries will be able to produce long-range missiles.”

Intelligence services have no exact information on the situation in the Soviet chaos. The U.S. intelligence service, the CIA, can also only estimate that about 2,000 experts in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus have the abilities to build nuclear weapons, and several thousand scientists would be able to develop and produce biological weapons.

If the terrible notions that trouble Kohl and Cheney were to materialize—and there are many indications that they will—the world would be dislocated. The consequence would not be the “new world order” that U.S. President George Bush dreamed of after the victory in the Gulf war but global disorder. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Technology Bound for Libya Intercepted

*LD2201161992 Hamburg DPA in German 1430 GMT
22 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to the Federal Government, customs authorities at Frankfurt Airport recently intercepted a shipment of nuclear technology from the United States destined for Libya. Government spokesman Dieter Vogel said in Bonn today that the tipoff came from a foreign intelligence service without giving any further details about the type of goods involved. In order to exclude the possibility of the shipment going any further, the Cabinet said that it passed a regulation, the 18th on the foreign trade law, today. According to the Economics Ministry, there have recently been repeated minor cases of deliveries to Libya via Germany that they failed to intercept.

Genscher Urges Action on Nuclear Proliferation

Talks With UN Secretary

*LD2401210192 Hamburg DPA in German 1934 GMT
24 Jan 92*

[Excerpt] New York (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that the danger of the virtually uncontrollable proliferation of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union must be the most important issue on the agenda at the meeting of the heads of state and government in New York on 31 January. “It is our view that it is high time, and possibly even too late,” Genscher said after his talks with UN Secretary Butrus Ghali in New York today.

“It is this problem that is worrying him so much, and he is convinced that something needs to happen very soon,” the press spokeswoman of the German UN Embassy, Christiane Gnadtke, explained. “Now, and not some time in the future,” Genscher said, after his meeting with Butrus Ghali. The “special importance” of this meeting of the Security Council on the highest level must make it clear that “the Council is broadening its responsibilities, and is now attending to the topical, important issues that are of real significance for mankind.” [passage omitted]

Comments Further

*LD2701084592 Hamburg DPA in German 0806 GMT
27 Jan 92*

[Text] Frankfurt/Main (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) has once again warned of the nuclear weapons proliferation by so-called technology mercenaries from the former Soviet Union. Speaking on

Hesse radio today, Genscher demanded that, like Germany, other countries too should make it a punishable offense for their citizens to collaborate in the development of mass destruction weapons even outside the individual country. Genscher also suggested that an international fund for out-of-work nuclear scientists be created. In addition, the UN Security Council should “impose all kinds of sanctions” against states trying to obtain nuclear weapons “and thereby isolate them in every way.” The world Security Council should make this “question of the survival of mankind” the central issue of its work as soon as possible.

Genscher, Ghali Discuss Nuclear Arms

*LD2401001192 Hamburg DPA in German 2326 GMT
23 Jan 92*

[Excerpts] New York, (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali in New York today to promote his (Genscher’s) plan for effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, this danger grew considerably, Genscher said, even though it always existed.

The initiative should emanate from nonnuclear states like Germany as well as from those possessing nuclear weapons, in order to preempt the argument of “power-hungry potentates” that the countries possessing nuclear weapons want to remain by themselves. [passage omitted]

Ghali expressed his “greatest understanding” for these necessities, Genscher said. The foreign minister said that he does not view his proposal as final; he is still open to other approaches. [passage omitted]

Former Soviet Plutonium, Uranium To Be Imported

Precautionary Measure

LD2901102192 Berlin ADN in German 0004 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Leipzig (ADN)—The Environment Ministry will import tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium from the former Soviet Union as a precautionary measure to prevent it from entering the international black market. LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG (Wednesday edition) reports that the internal paper Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer commissioned to this effect was completed in the last few days with ministerial approval. The Environment Ministry plans to use the plutonium to produce mixed oxide (Mox) fuel elements. The only German center for Mox production is the currently decommissioned Siemens fuel element works in Hanau. With an order endorsed by the entire Cabinet and with application of supervisory powers, Toepfer intends to have the Hesse land government put the plant back into commission. Hesse Environment

Minister Joschka Fischer told LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG that the threat of safety problems in the Soviet Union did nothing to change the fact that the old nuclear plants in Hanau "offer no possibility of processing plutonium, due to the safety concerns there." (The article was prereleased in an edited form.)

Planned Imports Denied

LD2901104692 Hamburg DPA in German 0945 GMT
29 Jan 92

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The weapons-grade plutonium accumulated during the disarming of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] nuclear weapons will not be brought to Germany and processed here into fuel elements for nuclear power plants, an Environment Ministry spokesman said on Wednesday [29 January] following a report in LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG of plans initiated by Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer. The spokesman told DPA that the technology for processing mixed oxide fuel elements out of highly dangerous plutonium is highly advanced in Germany and is being used in the Siemens fuel element plant in Hanau. Germany could use this technology "within an international strategy" for disposing of plutonium accumulated during worldwide nuclear disarmament. Toepfer himself said in an interview with DIE WELT (Wednesday edition): "We have done pioneering work in this field. Applying this technology to the disarming of nuclear weapons is a necessary consideration."

FRG Agreed to Nuclear Exports to Iraq

LD2101192492 Hamburg DPA in German 1722 GMT
21 Jan 92

[Text] Cologne (DPA)—Research by the WDR [West German Broadcasting Company] economics program "Plus 3" allegedly shows that the Federal Government agreed to the export to Iraq of machinery for the construction of uranium enrichment plants. It was known to Bonn that the plant was to be used for the production of nuclear weapons, the magazine program reported this evening on "West 3" television. Relevant export permits are said to have been granted to the firm H & H Metallform at Drensteinfurt in the Munsterland region as late as July 1989. The Federal Government itself stated that it was informed about the fact that Iraq was interested in nuclear technology from Germany in the autumn of 1988.

According to WDR's information, Bonn also knew about an Iraqi stake of 5.5 million marks in the company concerned. The responsible ministries also knew of an ongoing investigation for secret service activities by the Prosecutor's Office against one of the firms managers. The station is in possession of "internal documents" of the Economics Ministry and the Prosecutor's Office about all of this. (The information from "plus 3" was conveyed to DPA in an edited version.)

Participation in Iranian Arms Production Viewed

AU2901103792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 29 Jan 92 p 5

[“K.B.” report: “No Knowledge in Bonn of Participation in Production of Weapons in Iran”]

[Text] Bonn, 28 January—The Federal Government does not know of any lists at this point revealing German participation in the production and development of chemical and nuclear weapons in Iran. The Israeli paper HA'ARETZ mentioned a shift of German activities from Iraq to Iran. State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry Kastrup discussed this issue with the Israeli and U.S. ambassadors Wednesday [29 January] in Bonn. The ambassadors have been asked to immediately pass on any relevant information.

Government To Punish Illegal Arms Exports

AU2401123692 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by “deu”: “Bundestag Threatens To Punish Illegal Arms Exports With Long Prison Terms and Confiscation of Profits”]

[Text] Bonn—In the future, illegal arms exports will be punished with prison terms of up to five years and the confiscation of all profits from such deals. Concerning specific suspicious facts about illegal supplies, customs investigators may tap the telephones of arms exporters and open their mail. Following 12 months of discussions in Bonn, the Bundestag passed a law to this effect on 23 January. In addition, a new exports office will ensure tighter controls. The Federal Government was called upon to work to achieve European arms exports regulations. A motion brought in by the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] to temporarily halt all arms exports to the Near and Middle East failed to get majority backing. The CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] and the FDP [Free Democratic Party] rejected it.

Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann (FDP) stressed the need for such measures. He said that the involvement of German firms in Iraq's armament program shows "what great criminal energy we must expect in connection with illegal arms exports." The government and opposition are in agreement that the law is not aimed against industry as a whole, but only against a number of "black sheep." However, these exceptions "are so strong that they discredit the whole of German industry," SPD deputy Ernst Schwanhold said. The SPD voted against the bill, which was introduced by the Federal Government, because the Social Democrats consider the telephone tapping measures constitutionally objectionable. The SPD believes it would be better for customs investigators to make unannounced checks in order to closely check the books of firms that have come under suspicion. Because some coalition deputies shared the SPD's reservations, a time limit of until 1994 was set

for the permission to tap telephones. Public prosecutors must be informed of telephone tapping measures. In addition, a judge must approve such a measure, or, if in urgent cases it was ordered by the federal finance minister, confirm it within three days. Moellermann said that the protection of the citizens' private sphere guaranteed by the Constitution remains unaffected. However, illegal arms exporters must "be exposed before the weapons are abroad." The severest punishment is useless, "if we do not get the people," said Moellermann.

Despite the measures passed, SPD politicians expressed doubts about the government's seriousness regarding arms exports controls. Deputy Hermann Bachmaier criticized the Federal Government for selling or giving away NVA [GDR National People's Army] weapons even to countries in crisis regions: "Those who set such a bad example should not be surprised that unscrupulous dealers do not care a fig about our arms regulations." His fellow party member, Ernst Schwanhold, wondered why the coalition rejects a temporary halt to arms exports to the Near and Middle East: "This frightens us all the more since \$14.5 billion worth of weapons were supplied to Saudi Arabia alone last year." The SPD called upon the Federal Government to immediately pass on to the Bundestag all the information about nuclear exports to Iraq that the UN commission had presented to the Federal Government by mid-January. This information proves that German firms made possible Saddam Husayn's atomic bomb program.

The exports office that will be set up following a decision of the Bundestag will replace the existing Office for the Economy in Eschborn near Frankfurt. The 337 staff members of this office will be taken over. The Bundestag Budget Committee has authorized 93 additional slots for the export office, so that the number of staff will increase to 430.

CDU deputy Peter Kittelmann said that the German laws are "praiseworthy, but they are not worth anything," if other countries do not follow the German "trailblazer role." Therefore, the Bundestag called upon the government to call for EC-wide guidelines for arms exports. German laws will be largely irrelevant in the European single market as of 1993. Arms companies only have to take their products to neighboring countries with less tight controls to sell them from there. CSU deputy Ernst Hinsken said he is "worried that we are overdoing it with our German overeagerness." He said that he is concerned about competitive disadvantages for German business and industry, if the laws here are tighter than elsewhere. He added that small and medium-sized companies in particular are already overtaxed by the export permit procedures.

Bundestag Takes Measures Against Arms Exports

Foreign Trade Law Amended

*LD2301112692 Berlin ADN in German 1014 GMT
23 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Today the Bundestag decided on measures to prevent illegal weapons exports and passed

an appropriate draft to amend the Foreign Trade Law. At the same time, it resolved to set up a federal export office. For that purpose the department currently responsible for weapons export controls will split from the Federal Office for the Economy and its staff will be increased.

The new measures mean that the Customs Criminal Investigation Office in Cologne will be able to be effective prior to export deals. In addition, that office will have the authority, in accordance with prior judicial directives, to monitor postal and telephone communications if "facts indicate that serious criminal offenses are to be committed." Over and above that, by amending the criminal code and code on criminal procedures, prison sentences of up to five years or large fines will be able to be imposed for arms dealers. According to the amendment, the profits made from illegal weapons deals will be also able to be confiscated in full.

Export List Reduced

*LD2301113892 Berlin ADN in German 1449 GMT
22 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Federal Government decided to reduce the so-called "H" list of countries in Bonn today. That list contains the names of countries where there are restrictions for German exports. The decree will reduce from 54 to 34 the number of sensitive countries of destination where additional export controls are necessary. In that way the export of armaments or weapons-related goods to those countries is to be prevented.

At the same time, the list is to be brought into line with regulations in other large exporting countries such as the United States and Great Britain. Export controls in accordance with the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists are unaffected.

European Regulations Urged

*LD2301100192 Hamburg DPA in German 0910 GMT
23 Jan 92*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—All the parties in the Bundestag on Thursday called for unified European regulations on weapons exports. The plan for tougher penalties for illegal weapons exports and tighter controls, which was blocked by the Social Democratic Party majority in the Bundesrat last year because of worries about an increase in telephone tapping, are now to come into force. In the view of all the party groups, the penalties will not be adequate if 1993 sees a free internal market within the EC. That would cause the tougher German regulations to lose their effect.

NETHERLANDS

Firm Accused of Nuclear Equipment Sales to Libya

*LD2301144792 Hilversum Radio Netherlands
in English 1130 GMT 23 Jan 92*

[Text] A Dutch firm has been implicated in the sale to Libya of American-made equipment which could be used in a nuclear program. Apparently the Dutch company sent the shipment destined for Libya to Frankfurt via Schiphol airport. The Dutch Government's Economic Inspection Agency says it checked the consignment and found no reason to confiscate the goods on grounds of strategic importance.

The issue was made public following a German announcement that the shipment had been intercepted in Frankfurt last December. Germany has intensified its export controls since it became known during the Gulf War that a number of German companies had delivered goods to Iraq including weapons parts vital to the Iraqi arms buildup.

The Dutch Lower House member Paul Rosenmoeller has announced he will raise the issue in the Dutch parliament, and he expressed the view that the Netherlands should sharpen its export control policies. The name of the Dutch company involved has not been disclosed.

SWITZERLAND

Officials Seize Documents on Uranium Trafficking

*AU2601162992 Paris AFP in English 1607 GMT
26 Jan 92*

[Text] Zurich, Jan 26 (AFP)—A search of the home of a former high Zurich official arrested last November has turned up documents pertaining to uranium traffic between Switzerland and Italy, and items suggesting an arms traffic, the Zurich prosecutor said Sunday [26 January].

Prosecutor Beat Kunzli said the documents found last week included data and laboratory appraisals concerning 29 kilos (63.8 pounds) of lightly enriched uranium worth 100 million dollars which was seized in Zurich last November.

The official under arrest, identified only as a former head of the Economic Office of the Zurich Canton Department of Finance, is being prosecuted for having accepted bribes for hotel and restaurant licenses.

Kunzli said the presence of the documents in his home was not a punishable offense in itself, but "surprising" nonetheless. He said seven other people arrested last November in connection with the uranium seizure would be re-interrogated concerning their relationships with the official.

IAEA Director Discusses Nuclear Proliferation

*AU3001111392 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
30 Jan 92 p 3*

[Interview with Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], by Gerhard Bitzan in Vienna; date not given: "There Is No Hide-and-Seek With Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] [Bitzan] The nuclear arms race between the super-powers has ended. At the same time, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to increasing instability. Has the world become less secure?

[Blix] I am optimistic about the possibility of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The past year has shown that this is possible; it was a particularly eventful and positive year. Argentina and Brazil, two threshold countries, agreed to open their nuclear facilities. Then there is South Africa, which was also a great problem in the past. Last summer, North Korea drafted a protection and control agreement with us, binding it to permit inspection of all nuclear facilities and materials. This agreement will be signed in Vienna on 30 January.

In addition, the Middle East conference has begun. In this connection, arms control and disarmament measures will be discussed within a year. I am confident that the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East will be a decisive point. I think the creation of a universal nuclear nonproliferation instrument by 1995 is a sound prospect for the world.

[Bitzan] Aren't you too optimistic?

[Blix] There is, of course, also a negative aspect. The problems are based on our experience with Iraq. Yes, it is true—while we are gradually achieving greater acceptance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this treaty is being undermined. Iraq is one of the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and concluded an agreement with us that binds Baghdad to inform us about all nuclear materials and facilities. At the same time, however, Baghdad prepared a comprehensive uranium-enrichment program. That was clearly a violation of its obligations.

[Bitzan] Could such a thing not repeat itself in other countries?

[Blix] It do not think so. There is no reason to panic over this. But it is important to learn from this case and take it as a warning. Iraq is a rather unusual example. It is a country with large resources that has the ambition to dominate the region. There are only a few similar cases in the world.

We in the agency have drawn the conclusion that the verification system, the safeguards system, must be improved. I think, however, that the case of Iraq has demonstrated something important. Baghdad had more than 30 kilograms of enriched uranium that were registered with us. This uranium was classified as fuel for

Iraq's reactors and has never been touched. This shows that a country that is under surveillance does not attack. A lot of material in the world is under surveillance.

The negative aspect is that the system is not designed for finding hidden secrets. What can we do if a country hides important facilities? Our experience in Iraq, where we can move freely and have all possibilities to work, shows that we are still not sure we have found everything. In other cases, the world may not have the right to carry out such massive inspections.

[Bitzan] What can the agency do to rule out risks to a large extent?

[Blix] We must above all increase our special inspections. If we have a suspicion, we can demand that a given country permit such inspections; but we are not an intelligence organization, and we do not have satellites. Like the police, we must wait for tips—and then we act.

[Bitzan] What information do you have on nuclear material and nuclear specialists from the former Soviet Union going to unpredictable powers?

[Blix] We do not have the staff to control Russian individuals or military who sell weapons. We do not have the relevant insider information. It is our job to control the peaceful use of nuclear energy and not the military sector. So far, there have been no verified reports, only rumors.

There have also been reports on the transfer of nuclear material like uranium and plutonium. Everything must be examined. But we do not have specific leaks here either. It is correct that small quantities of plutonium are on the market. Such small quantities are often used in industry. Of course, we should be more careful with these small quantities.

[Bitzan] The problem of nuclear scientists surely is a more specific one, isn't it?

[Blix] Certainly, there is a risk in this area. It would be a positive thing for the West to help the Russians by trying to set up various projects in the nuclear area to give these experts useful jobs. In a country like the former Soviet Union, which has so many problems, the West could help examine nuclear contamination, for instance, or develop peaceful nuclear energy or eliminate nuclear weapons.

We in the IAEA are currently compiling a list of projects that we planned to do in the past but have not been able to carry out because of financial problems. These projects could be based on Soviet specialists. If anyone in the Western world is willing to give the money, we could certainly help and could employ the scientists.

Nuclear disarmament is also a problem. Under the INF Treaty, the nuclear warheads are left. They are stored. So there is no disarmament of plutonium or enriched uranium. I informed Yeltsin that we would have the ability

to control the storage of this material and to transfer it to civilian areas and to use it as fuel for power plants, for instance.

[Bitzan] Islamic states have recently been talked about as new and dangerous nuclear powers.

[Blix] We have found no evidence in Iran of any transfer of nuclear material. We told the Iranians that if anyone voices a suspicion, it would be wise for them to ask the agency to send some inspectors. Every country that comes under suspicion of having secret nuclear operations should do so. This also holds true for Libya, where I am going now.

Joint Export Controls for Strategic Arms Planned

*AU2301130492 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 23 Jan 92 p 6*

[“mue.” report: “Export of Strategic Weapons To Be Examined”]

[Text] Brussels—The national export controls of the 12 EC states for so-called strategically sensitive weapons will possibly be harmonized, and the Community will be entrusted with them. The Brussels EC Commission has taken an initiative in which Germany is especially interested because its industry has acquired the reputation of carrying out unlawful, large-scale exports of goods that are abused—particularly by Third World rulers—for armament purposes. In the EC a joint authority must be authorized for controls when all border barriers are abolished in the European single market at the end of the year.

The responsible commissioners, Frans Andriessen and Martin Bangemann, do not claim for the EC the right to regulate and control the export of weapons; this right will

only be granted to the Community in a later joint defense policy. Rather, Brussels’ advance is restricted to “products and technologies with dual use,” that is, civilian and military, that, according to the EC Treaty, fall under the Community’s foreign trade responsibility but are part of the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] lists for example, and thus are subject to national export permits and controls. Therefore, the commissioners are striving to achieve the harmonization of national controls for precisely defined dual-use goods that are included in the four currently valid international export lists. In addition to the Cocom list, these are the control regulation for missile technology, the nonproliferation treaty, and the precursors of the treaties on a chemical and biological weapons ban.

After 12 months of investigations, the three commissioners believe they have encountered sufficient goodwill to carry this out in all 12 capitals because of the rapidly approaching start of the single market without borders. The governments are aware that the single market cannot be completed without such a joint export control regime since, after all, trade within the Community in strategically important goods accounts for 5 to 9 percent of all cross-border trade in the single market. In practice, controls are concentrated on high technology branches. For example, the trade between German manufacturers of electronic goods and the Italian machine tool industry is largely controlled. Moreover, the end of the East-West conflict has increased the governments’ preparedness to entrust the Community with responsibility for this because it is in the interest of all that Saddam Husayn is not provided with dual-use products. Third, the Brussels commissioners finally stress explicitly that the joint authorizing and control procedures must be at least as effective as the best national ones or even better.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103

2

5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.